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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1.

Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence

illegally obtained by the State through abuse of the Subpoena
Powers Act?
2.

Did the trial court and the majority in the Court of

Appeals misperceive the scope and application of the Utah Antitrust Act in relation to the facts of the present case?
3.

Was a vertical agreement of exclusive dealing between a

single buyer and seller of services a criminal group boycott
under the Utah Antitrust Act?
4.

Did felony RICE convictions based exclusively on

misdemeanor predicate acts violate the constitutional prohibition
of cruel and unusual punishment?
5.

Did a juror's knowledge of the earlier conviction of a

Co-Defendant on the charges against Defendants require a mistrial?
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
This Petition for Certiorari seeks review of the opinion of
the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 860357-CA which was filed
March 9, 1988, and is reported at 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34.
RELATED CASES
A related case decided by this Court is In The Matter of a
Criminal Investigation, reported at 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3,
March 31, 1988.

That case deals with the constitutionality of

the investigation used to obtain the evidence presented against
the Defendants in the case at bar.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioners seek review of the Utah Court of Appeals decision entered March 9, 1988.
April 8, 1988.

Petition for Rehearing was denied

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1987).
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following controlling constitutional and statutory
provisions are reproduced in full in the Appendix to this Petition.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah
Utah

Const. Amendment IV
Const. Amendment V
Const. Amendment VIII
Const. Art. I § 7
Const. Art. I § 9
Const. Art. I § 12
Const. Art. I § 14
Antitrust Act;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-911, et seq.
Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et seq.
Utah Bribery Statute;
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a criminal case.

Defendants were charged with

several counts of commercial bribery, antitrust group boycott,
and racketeering.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts
Petitioners were tried in 1986 with co-defendant Michael
Ziemski.

Prior to trial the Defendants were granted a severance

from the trial of co-defendant L. Brent Fletcher.

Petitioners

moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a secret
investigation in Emery County.

The motion was denied.

The

Petitioners were found guilty by a jury on several counts of
bribery, antitrust and racketeering.

Defendant Thompson was

sentenced to serve not less than one nor more than fifteen years
in the Utah State Prison.

Defendant Conklin was sentenced to

serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail on work release.
Each Petitioner was fined $25,000 for the antitrust violations.
Based on the racketeering convictions the Court also ordered
forfeiture of all business interest of the Petitioners in the
security guard companies involved in the case.
During trial, Petitioners moved for mistrial on the basis
that the prosecution had improperly elicited from two witnesses
the fact that the co-defendant Fletcher had previously been tried
on the same charges and on the further basis that a juror had
discovered the fact that Fletcher was convicted.
were also denied.

These motions

Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on

September 13, 1986.
Petitioners1 sentences were stayed pending appeal.

The

appeal was originally filed in this Court but was subsequently
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals and heard there.

Two

members of the Utah Court of Appeals panel voted to affirm the
convictions.

Judge Gregory K. Orme dissented as to the group

boycott antitrust convictions.

Appellants Thompson and Conklin

petitioned the Court for a Rehearing.

The Petition was denied

April 8, 1988.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves the alleged bribery of L. Brent Fletcher,
an employee of Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), in the spring
of 1983.

Defendants Thompson, Conklin, and Ziemski were the

payors of the alleged bribes.

At various times between 1976 and

1985, Thompson, Conklin, and Ziemski were either principals in or
employees of the security guard companies which provided security
guard services to, among other customers, UP&L.
Beginning in 1974, and continuing thereafter at: all relevant
times, Fletcher was the security officer of UP&L.

(Tr. 42). The

position was a staff position, not a management position.
347, 1024, 1103-04).

Fletcher's function was to act as a coordi-

nator between management and the guard company.
337).

(Tr.

(Tr. 49-50,

He was not, however, authorized to enter or terminate

guard contracts (Tr. 352, 1024), grant rate increases (Tr. 1024)
or decide whether a contract should be competitively bid (Tr.
1025-26, 1105).

Fletcher simply made recommendations to a

committee, and all witnesses agreed that his position was not
influential.

(Tr. 85, 347).

UP&L first purchased services of outside security guard
companies in 1976.

At that time, miners at UP&L coal mines in

Carbon and Emery Counties went on strike.

UP&L hired the ser-

vices of two independent guard companies, Mike Thompson Associates and Pinkerton's, Inc., to control the situation.

(Tr. 80).

This arrangement continued until the strike ended.
In 1978, UP&L decided to hire an outside guard company on a
permanent basis.

Several companies were considered, including

Pinkerton's and Mike Thompson Associates.

(Tr. 80).

Upon

Fletcher's recommendation that Mike Thompson Associates had been
the most flexible during the strike situation, UP&L entered a
contract for guard services with Mike Thompson Associates in
February, 1978.

(Tr. 44). Defendant Thompson, the owner of Mike

Thompson Associates, signed the contract with UP&L.

(Ex. 1).

The contract was renewed in March, 1981. (Ex. 2).
In 1982, Mike Thompson Associates filed bankruptcy.
74).

(Ex.

Performance of the UP&L contract was transferred to

Vanguard, Inc., a new company formed by Ziemski.

(Tr. 171-73,

732, 734). Neither Thompson nor Conklin were principals in or
employees of Vanguard.

(Tr. 1403-05).

After leaving Mike

Thompson Associates, Thompson joined with Conklin to form Information Associates, which provided consulting services in the
areas of guard training and security services.
1394-96).

(Tr. 1389-90,

In August of 1983, Ziemski transferred control of

Vanguard to Conklin.

The seven alleged briberies all occurred during the spring
of 1983. (R. V:47-53, 64-70, 77-83; Ex. 31, 56). Each alleged
bribe was paid by check from Information Associates to Augie
Investments, which Fletcher owned.

Each check indicated that

payment was for "consulting services," (Ex. 56), and indeed in
the spring of 1983 Information Associates was preparing, with
help from Fletcher, a manual on nuclear power plant security.
(Tr. 1400-02, 1416),

The jury acquitted Defendants on two of the

bribery counts.
The State also alleged the payments to be part of a larger
scheme to eliminate competition for the UP&L contract.
V:54-57,

71-74,

Petitioners

84-87.)

According

to

that

(R.

allegation,

Ziemski and Fletcher formed a group boycott,

beginning in September 1978 and continuing through October 1983,
pursuant to which the defendants paid Fletcher in order to obtain
favorable treatment from him in their dealings with UP&L.
The evidence, however, was that UP&L was satisfied with its
guard service.

(Tr. 90-91, 1188-89, 1223-24, 1236, 1254,

1294-95, 1311).

Indeed, although Fletcher left UP&L in 1983,

Vanguard continued to provide UP&L security for UP&L until the
day before trial.

(Tr. 97). Further, the evidence established

that other companies were not precluded from offering services to
UP&L.

(Tr. 98-99, 522-25, 535-38, 582-85).

Defendants were also charged with racketeering.

The State

alleged that the racketeering violation was established by

"multiple acts of bribery.1'

(R. V:58-64, 75-76, 88-89).

With

respect to Conklin and Ziemski, the briberies alleged to support
the racketeering counts were the seven bribes allegedly paid in
1983.

With respect to Thompson, the State claimed that eight

additional bribes were allegedly paid to Fletcher in the spring
of 1979.
ARGUMENT
Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule 43(4) of the
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court since this case presents important questions of state law, which should be settled by this
Court.

The issue of the scope and application of the Utah

Antitrust Act was recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals as one
of first impression.

See State v. Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep.

34, 36 (March 9, 1988).

This Court should review the majority

opinion of the Court of Appeals in light of the strong dissent
filed by Judge Orme.
Similarly the Court of Appeals decision expanding the
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule
should be reviewed in light of this court's opinion in In the
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March
31,

1988).

The remaining

constitutional significance.

issues presented here are of
Accordingly, this Court should

grant certiorari in order to settle important questions of state
and constitutional law.

I.

Evidence Obtained Illegally by the State Through Abuse

of the Subpoena Powers Act Should Have Been Suppressed.

On

March 31, 1988, this Court handed down its opinion in Criminal
Investigation.
tutionality

In that case, this Court reviewed the consti-

of the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann.

§§ 77-22-12-3 (1982).

This Court found the Act to be constitu-

tional on its face so long as certain enumerated guidelines are
followed.

Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7-16.

This Court also reviewed the constitutionality of the Act as
applied in Criminal Investigation and found that it was unconstitutional as applied.

Ld. at 3.

This is extremely important since the evidence used in
Petitioner's trial in the case at bar was almost wholly obtained
through the investigation condemned Criminal Investigation.

See

Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35.
Although the State's investigation was eventually dismissed
because of the abuse of the Subpoena Powers Act, the damage to
the Petitioners had already been done.
ill-gotten evidence and convicted.

They were tried with the

A review of this Court's

analysis of the manner the investigation was conducted reveals
that the Defendants were denied fundamental state and federal
constitutional rights.
Specifically, this Court found that each subpoena issued
represented that it had been authorized by order of the District
Court and that disobedience to the subpoena was punishable by

contempt of court.

Since the subpoenas had not been individually

authorized and because contempt of court is a multi-step process,
the representations on the supoenas were misstatements which may
have "improperly discouraged the recipients from challenging the
supoenas."

Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16.

This Court further observed that "to the extent that these
misrepresentations discouraged respondents or other subpoenaed
parties from exercising their right to challenge the supoenas,
they denied rights guaranteed by the Act and by the Fourth
Amendment."

I^i. at 17.

This Court also noted that the Attorney General failed to
notify the Defendants (including these Petitioners) prior to
interrogation "of the general nature and scope of the investigation and of the right to exercise the privilege against self
incrimination.

These failures violated Respondents state and

federal constitutional privileges against self incrimination."
Id. at 17.
Additionally, this Court held that the secrecy provisions of
the Subpoena Powers Act were applied too broadly inasmuch as the
District Court ordered that the good cause affidavit itself was
a secret document.

"[T]o the extent that the concealment of the

good cause statement impeded the challenge of supoenas or interrogations, it operated to deny rights against unreasonable search
and seizure."

Id. at 17.

Notwithstanding the serious violation of Defendants1 constitutional rights, the trial court in the case at bar refused to
suppress the fruits of the illegal investigation.

Just days

before this Court's decision in the Criminal Investigation the
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was properly admitted at
trial

ff

[r]egardless of the decision of the Utah Supreme Court on

the constitutionality of the Utah [Subpoena Powers Act] . . . ."
Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36.
The Court of Appeals1 rationale was based on the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104
S.Ct. 3405 (1984), and Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987).
According to Leon and Krull, a police officer's search in objectively reasonably reliance on an invalid warrant or an unconstitutional statute does not require exclusion of evidence.

This

"good faith11 exception is based on the theory that exclusion of
evidence produces no deterrent effect on illegal searches when
the searching officer was acting in reasonable reliance on legal
authority.
This rationale is inapplicable in the context of this case.
The Court here is not dealing with a police officer but rather
with experienced lawyers employed by the Attorney General's
Office.

While an officer may not be expected to analyze the

constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of a warrant, a
prosecutor must be expected to engage in such an analysis.

This

is especially true where, as in the case at bar, the State's
chief legal office, which is frequently requested to publish
opinions concerning the propriety of conduct, is in charge of the
investigation.

If the Attorney General's Office can be expected

to advise the various State agencies as to the proper and legal
manner to conduct their affairs, then a fortiori that office
should be expected to conduct its own affairs in conformity with
legal and constitutional bounds.
The Court of Appeals ignored the vital distinction between
police conduct and conduct of the Attorney General's Office.
Applying the Krull Standard, the Court stated that "the subpoenas
duces tecum were executed in objectively reasonable reliance on
prior, external authorization."
36.

Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at

This statement should not stand as good law in Utah for at

least two reasons.
First, the Attorney General's Office admitted that the
Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutionally applied.
Investigation 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5.

Criminal

Such an admission is

inconsistent with the position that the Attorney General's Office
relied on the Act in good faith.

At a minimum, good faith would

require the Attorney General's Office to engage in a constitutional analysis before applying the Act.
Secondly, the Court of Appeals' assumption that the Attorney
General's Office acted in a good faith objective reliance on the
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of showing lack of good

faith to the Defendants.
tional.

Such a shift of burden is unconstitu-

State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987).

This Court should grant a writ of certiorari because Defendants1 fundamental federal constitutional rights were violated by
the State's abuse of the Subpoena Powers Act.

The evidence

introduced at Defendants' trial should have been suppressed.
Even assuming arguendo, that the good faith exception
recognized in Leon and Krull are applicable to the conduct of a
prosecutor's office, and further assuming that the illegal
investigation was conducted in good faith, the evidence should
still have been suppressed.

Nothing prohibits this Court from

imposing more stringent restrictions upon the conduct of law
enforcement and prosecutors than is imposed under the United
States Constitution.

The rights protected by Sections 7, 12 and

14 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah need not
suffer erosion merely because the United States Supreme Court has
narrowed the scope of the federal constitutional Exclusionary
Rule.

Therefore Petitioners request this Court to consider and

decide the scope of the protections guaranteed by our State
Constitution.
II.

Defendants1 Conduct Did Not Constitute a Criminal

Violation of the Utah Antitrust: Act.

This Court should also

issue a writ of certiorari because the Court of Appeals' decision
was the first published judicial treatment of Utah's Antitrust
Act.

Furthermore, the Court of Appeals was split in its view of

the application of that Act with Judge Orme filing a strong,
thoughtful and persuasive dissent.
In order to convict on the antitrust group boycott charges,
three elements were required:

1) That Defendants entered a

conspiracy or contract in restraint of trade, 2) in the form of a
group boycott, 3) with specific intent to eliminate competition.
The legislature has declared its intent that the Utah
Antitrust Act be interpreted in accordance with federal court
interpretations of federal antitrust acts.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-10-926 (1979).
The federal courts have recognized that bribery in and of
itself does not constitute a violation of the antitrust acts.
United States v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 380 U.S. 157, 162, 85
S. Ct. 868 (1965); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagon of America,
Inc. , 532 F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S.
940 (1976); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Ltd., 547 F.
Supp. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982).

The Court of Appeals majority

held that a co-defendant's refusal to accept proprosals from
other security guard companies was sufficient indication that the
bribes were intended to restrain trade.

Thompson, 77 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 37. However, in his dissent, Judge Orme pointed out that
any agreement to deal exclusively with one party necessarily
contemplates a refusal to deal with other parties.

Thompson, 77

Utah Adv. Rep. at 43 (citing Construction Aggregate Trans, v.
Florida Road Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 776 (11th Cir. 1983)).

Such an

arrangement does not violate antitrust law.

Two Cities Sport

Service, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n.9
(9th Cir. 1982).

Judge Orme also noted that state law already

provides for punishment for commercial bribery.

Utah Code Ann.

§ 76-6-508 (1978).
The majority admitted that the classic definition of "per se
group boycott" is a situation in which "two or more competitors
on the same level of the market structure agree to eliminate a
target horizontal competitor by combining to deny the target of
elements needed in order to compete."

Thompson, 77 Utah Adv.

Rep. at 38. The Court also recognized that the instant case does
not present the classic per se group boycott situation.

Id.

However, the Court turned away from the established group boycott
definition and analysis and replaced it with a much broader
approach.

The Court defined group boycott as "a method of

pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or
enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the
target."

I_d. at 39.

However, as Judge Orme noted, even under

the majority's definition, no group boycott existed in this case.
"There was no dispute, no pressure, no enlistment of others to
withhold services, and no target for elimination."

I^d. at 44.

The majority apparently grouped together all entities offering the services of security guards as the "target."

This

application is contrary to the accepted definition of the term
"target," which usually denotes "a person or business against

which competitive aim is taken . . . ."

Reaemco Inc. v.

Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D.C.N.Y. 1980).

Under

the theory that all security companies were the target of the
alleged boycott, any such company in existence at the time could
bring an action against Defendants for treble damages.
Ann. § 76-10-919 (1985).

Utah Code

Certainly, the legislature did not

intend such a result.
The Court of Appeals observed that several cases recognized
per se group boycotts between a "single horizontal competitor and
vertically related company."

Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39.

Significantly, in each case cited (Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western
Cabinet Millwork, 710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983); Corn-Tel Inc. v.
DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Corey v. Look, 641
F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981)) there was a specific identifiable entity
which had been singled out as the "target11 of the alleged boycotts.

The lack of any such target in the present case precludes

the finding of group boycott under the Court of Appeals majority
definition, as well as under the traditional definition.
This Court should review this case in order to resolve the
questions raised by Judge Orme!s dissent to the Court of Appeals1
opinion and to clarify the Utah Antitrust Act.
III.

Felony RICE Convictions Based Solely on Misdemeanor

Charges Violated Defendants1 State and Federal Constitutional
Protections Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment.

The constitu-

tional protection against cruel and unusual punishment "prohibits

not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are
disproportionate to the crime committed."

Solem v. Helm, 463

U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006 (1983).

In Solem the United

States Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a defendant's conviction under a state recidivist statute.

The defendant in that

case had several prior felony convictions on his record at the
time he was convicted of issuing a bad check, a misdemeanor.
Under the habitual criminal statute, the defendant was sentenced
to life in prison without parole.

The United States Supreme

Court held that since the sentence was not proportionate to the
crime it was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.
The RICE charges in the present case carry a penalty of one
to fifteen years in prison in addition to a $10,000 fine and
significant property forfeitures.

However, the predicate acts

upon which the racketeering charges were based consisted only of
several alleged briberies which were Class B misdemeanors with a
maximum jail sentence of six months and which, at the time of
commission, carried a fine of up to $299.00.
The fact that a defendant can be subjected to such extreme
punishment for offenses deemed petty elsewhere in the criminal
code requires that the RICE Act be limited to predicate acts
constituting felony offenses.
IV.

Utah Const. Art. I § 9.

A Juror's Knowledge That a Co-Defendant Had Been

Convicted in an Earlier Trial Required the Declaration of a
Mistrial.

When an incident at trial has a reasonable likelihood

of prejudicing the jury so that it may have affected the result,
the court should grant a mistrial.

State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d

367, 370, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974).

In the case at bar,

two of the State's witnesses indicated that co-defendant Fletcher
had already been tried on the same charges.

(Tr. 69-70, 621).

Later, the court was informed that one of the jurors learned from
the newspaper that Fletcher had in fact been convicted. (Tr.
1581-81).
juror.

This knowledge was very likely to have prejudiced that

A juror's knowledge or belief that a co-defendant had

already been found guilty of accepting the very bribes that
Petitioners are accused of paying could only serve to impermissibly shift the burden of proof to the defendants in the mind of
that juror.

The potential effect of this knowledge or belief on

the ultimate verdict is too dangerous to ignore.
The fact that a juror knew of Fletcher's prior conviction
was even more prejudicial when viewed in "light of the total
proceeding."

Hodges, 517 P.2d at 1324. The inadmissible hearsay

evidence regarding Fletcher's unusual use of cash, (Ex. 56)
evidence of UP&L employee misconduct, and the wholesale admission
of bank records were additional evidentiary errors given short
shrift by the Court of Appeals.

Taken together, these errors

should have compelled a declaration of mistrial.
Utah

Adv. Rep. at 42.

Thompson, 77

CONCLUSION
The issues raised in this petition are of substantial import
to the body of Utah law.

Defendants-Petitioners respectfully

request that this Court issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah
Court of Appeals and provide the review that these issues
deserve.
DATED this

day of May, 1988.
SESSIONS & MOORE

JOHN F. CLARK
JOHN K. WEST
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the

day of May, 1988, I caused

four true and correct copies of the foregoing PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI to be hand-delivered to the following:

David L. Wilkinson
Stanley H. Olsen
UTAH STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff ana Resoondent,
v.
L. Brent Fletcher. Michael C. THOMPSON,
Bruce A. Conklin and Michael Ziemski,
Defendants and Appellants.
Before Judge* Bencn, Davidson and Orme.
iNo. 860357-CA
FILED: March 9, 1988
THIRD DISTRICT
Honorable Judith M Billings
ATTORNEYS
Max D. Wheeler, Rodney R. Parker for
Appellants
David L Wilkinson, Stephen J Sorenson,
Richard M Hagstrom, David J.
Scnwendiman, Robert N Parnsh, Stanley
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OPINION
BENCH, Jua^e:
Derendanrs aopeal their convictions on
several counts ot bribery, antitrust, and racketeering This aopeal was initially tiled with
the Utah SuDreme Court and was transierred
to this Court pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct. 4A.
We atfirm the convictions.
Facts
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brent
Fletcher .vas empioved as security officer tor
Utah Power and Light ComDanv (UP&L) As
security officer, Fletcher^ duties were to
determine the security needs ot the company,
make recommendations to management, and
act as coordinator between management and
the security guard services. In 1978, UP&L
decided to hire the services ot a security guard
company on a full-time basis. On Fletcher's
recommendation, UP&L executed a contract
.with defendant Michael T h o m p s o n ' s
company, Mike Thompson Associates (MTA),
in February 1978 This contract was not
competitivelv bid
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother-inlaw, was hired by MTA. At Fletcher's
request, Wall opened a bank account in the
name of Secuntv Management Consultant
Services. Between January and June 1979,
Wall deposited approximately $23,000 in
checks rrom MTA into this account. In June
1979, Wall turned over the account and its
records to Fietcner at his reauest UP&L and
MTA renewea their contract m March 1981.

Thompson lett MTA in 1982 and formed
Information Associates, l security consulting
firm, with defendant Bruce Conklin, a former
employee of MTA. Defendant Michaei
Ziemski, also a former empiovee, tooic control
ot MTA and signed a new contract with
UP&L in October 1982. ZiemsKi later cnanged
the name of MTA to Vanguard International
Associates, Inc. In 1983, Ziemski transierred
control of Vanguard to Conkhn. An assignment of the UP&L contract was executed m
March 1984
During the soring of 1983, Information
Associates deposited approximately 525,000, in
seven separate payments, into the account of
Augie Investments, also owned by Fletcher.
Meanwhile, Vanguard deposited about
$163,000 into the account ot Information
Associates
The State of Utah, alleging these multiple
payments to Fletcher were bribes as pan of a
scneme to eliminate compention tor the UP&L
security contract, charged Thompson with
seven counts ot commercial bnberv, each a
class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-508<b) (1978), one count
ot antitrust grouo ooycoti. a second degree
felonv in violation ot Utah Code Ann. §§7610-914 and -920 (1979), and two counts ot
racketeering, second degree telonies in violation ot Utah Code Ann. ^76-10-1603
(1981). Ziemski and Conklin were each
cnarged with seven counts ot onoerv, one
count of antitrust group boycott, and one
count of racketeering. Fietcner, also a defendant, was cnarged with counts similar to
Thompson Fietcner was tried ^eparateiv and
convicted prior to defendants' trial. His
appeal is also decided tms date. 5ee Stats v.
Fletcher, 11 Utan Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct.
App.,March9, 1988).
Pretrial motions to dismiss ail counts were
denied. Defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a secret investigation in Emery Countv was also denied. The
case was tried to a jurv on July 18 through
August 1, 1985, the Honoraole Judith M.
Billings presiding The JUP/ found eacn defendant guilty ot five counts or bribery and of
ail racketeering and antitrust counts. Motions
for mistrial were denied. Thompson was sentenced to serve not less than one nor more
than fifteen years in the Utan State Pnson.
Conklin and Ziemski were each sentenced to
serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail on
work release. Eacn defendant was fined
525,000 tor the antitrust violations. Based on
the racketeering convictions, the court also
ordered torreiture of ail business interests of
defendants in the guard companies involved in
the case. The sentences were all stayed pending
appcai
On appeal, defendants challenge the jurisdiction ot the 'nai court and the court's
denial of their motion to suppress certain
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evidence. Defendants also challenge specmc I seized pursuant to the investigation. After a
jurv instructions, each or their convictions, hearing on December 27, 1984, Judge Billings
ana the trial court's denial ot their motion for . held Judge Bunnell's ruling to be the law of
the case. However, in a memorandum decision
a mistrial.
dated January 10, 1985, Judge Billings denied
Jurisdiction and Pronaole Cause tor Arrest
defendants' motion to suppress The evidence
Defendants fin>t argue the affidavit upon I
was suoseauentiv admitted to prove the suoswnich their arrest warrants were based railed I
tance ot the crimes cnarged.
to estaolisn probaole cause. The arrebt warrThe basis for the trial court's denial of
ants were thererore allegeaiy invalid, and the |
tnai court was deprived ot junsdiaion over I defendants' motion to suppress was as
defendants. The Utah Supreme Court has j follows:
The appropriate standard for sup"rejected) the position that the probable cause I
pression of the evidence acquired
reauirement tor arrest warrants is jumdicti- I
under the 'Subpoena Powers Act"
onai." State v Scnreuaer, 712 P 2d 264, 272 I
in this case requires that the defe(Utah 1985) In Schreuder, the defendant I
ndants show, as the State contends.
challenged her conviction on the ground that |
a "suostantial violation' ot defenthe statement presented in support of the I
dants' constitutional ngnts and that
arrest warrant failed to estabhsn the reauisite |
the violation was 'not commuted in
procable cause. The Court, assuming lack of I
good faitn," as reauired oy Rule
prooaoie cau^e tor the purDOses of discussion,
12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal
aaooted the majority rule that an "illegal
Procedure (Section 77-35-12(g)).
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent |
Defendants have neither acknowleconviction/ Id. at 2-Tl (quoting Centetn v. I
dged this Rule, nor attempted to
Pusn, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975)). The Court i
meet the required showing for
explained:
suppression of evidence.
[The] prooable cause requirement
On appeal, defendants claim the evidence m
for an arrest warrant oecomes moot
the instant case was obtained without egai
by the time a defendant has been
process and should thererore be suppressed
convicted because the much more
Defendants contend the government's actions
stringent requirements ol proor at
were in violation ot their individual ngnts to
trial have been employed to protect
and expectations of privacy.
the defendant.
The eniorcement of a subpoena duces tecum
712 P 2d at 272. In light of Schreuder, we
is
subject to fourth amendment restrictions
hold defendants' challenge to the tnai court's
against unreasonaole searcnes and seizures,
jurisdiction u> moot.
aithougn not to the extent or a search warrant.
Admissibility of Evidence
j Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327
Defendants next argue the trial court erred U.S. 186 (1946). Defendants' claims to an
in denying their motion to suppress certain expectation oi privacy are rights protected
evidence The instant case began with a secret under the fourth amendment. Rakas v. Illiinvestigation conducted in Emery County nois. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Furthermore,
under thz authontv of Judge Boyd Bunnell, I "[e]vidence is suppressed or excluded only if
Seventh District Court, and pursuant to Utah j the same was obtained by a violation of the
Code Annotated §§77-22-1 througn -3 Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a
(1982), commonly referred to as the Subpoena | person's right to privacy ana property." State
Pcv-ers kci or 'he Utau Min.-Grana ^ury \ v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 41, 414 P 2d
Act. During the investigation, the prosecution | 958,960(1966).
used ^uopoenas duces tecum to accumulate I
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
most or the evidence used at trial, including | (1934), the United States Supreme Court
tax and bank records from defendants' acco- I created the good faith exception to the excluuntants and banKS. Upon a motion by delen- I sionary rule: where an officer acts in objectidants challenging the constitutionality ot the | vely reasonaole reliance on a subsequentiv
Act, Judge Bunnell concluded the Act had invalidated warrant, the exclusionary rule does
been aoused and was subject to continual | not apply. The Utah state legislature codified
abuse due to its broad terms ana provisions. the Leon good faith exception m Utan Code
Judge Bunnell declared the Act unconstituti- Ann. §77-35-12(g) (1982). As prcviousiv
onal, dismissed trie investigation, and juasned i discussed, the trial court denied defendants'
all outstanding subpoenas. The prosecution's motion to suppress for failure to meet the
appeal of that ruling is now pending betore requirements ot section 77-35-12(g).
the Urah Supreme Court. In the Matter of a |
However, the Utah Supreme Court recently
Criminal Investigation, No. 20268 (Utan filed i invalidated section 77-35-12(g). In State v.
Oct. 25, 1984).
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), the
Based on Judge Bunnell's ruling, defend- Court rejected the prosecution's argument
ants filed a motion to suppress ail evidence that the good faith exception snoutd aopiy to
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an invalid, warrantless stop and search oi a
vehicle The Court explained that because "no
outside authority on whicn the officers could
reasonaoly rely expressly authorized the search
.., the pohcv toundations ot the Leon exception do not appear in searcnes of [this
kind) ' Id. at 185 Furthermore, section 7735-12(g) went bevond the scope ot the good
faith exception in requiring defendants to
prove a substantial violation oi the'r tourtn
amendment rignts Since section 77-35-12(g)
purported to create a good faith exception to
an investigatory stoo and search and because it
improperly snifted the burden or proor, the
Court round the statute violated the fourth
amendment ot the United States Constitution
Altnougn section 77-35-12(g) is now
invalid, the good faun exception to the exclusionary rule under Leon is still valid.
Defendants argue the good faith exception
appiicaote to search warrants does not appiy
to the execution of suDpoenas issued pursuant
to a statute subsequently declared unconstitutional. This position is contrary to Illinois v
Kruil. 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987) In KrulL the
Court granted certiorari to determine whether
the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule should oe recosnizea when officers act m
objectively reasonaoie reliance upon a statute
authorizing warrantless administrative searcnes
where the statute is ultimately found io be
unconstitutional. An Illinois stature permitted
government officers to conduct warrantless
searches ot the records ot dealers in automobiles ind automobile parts. Such a .searcn
snowed Kruil to oe in possession ot stolen
automooiles. Subseauent to 'he search, a
tederal court in an unrelated matter held tne
Illinois law to be unconstitutionally oroad.
Upon motion by defendant, the trial court
suppressed the evidence based on the tederal
court ruling The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, reiecting the state's good taith exception argument.
The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court explained the good faith exception
was estaohshed because the deterrent si feet
and remedial purpose of the exclusionary rule
are not served where an officer acts m objectively reasonable reliance on a search warrant
issued by a neutral magistrate. Likewise, the
Court held, "if [a) statute is subsequently
declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial
declaration will not deter future Fourth
Amendment violations bv an officer who has
sirnpiy fulfilled his responsibility to enrcrce
the statute as written.' Id. at II67 In Mendoza,
the Utan Supreme Court noted, "Xrull does not
a f f e c t o u r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of
Leon. In both cases, the officers conducting
the searches did so in oojectively reasonable
reliance on prior, external authorization.7 748
P.2d at 185 n.3. Likewise, in the instant case,
the subpoenas duces tecum were executed in

^ o ^

oojectiveiv reasonable reliance on prior, exteI rnal authorization.
This Court mav affirm a trial court's decision to admit evidence on any proper ground,
I even though the trial court assigned another
j reason for its ruling State v Barber. 747 P 2d
436 (Utan App 1987) Regardless ot the decision of the Utah Supreme Court on the conI stitutionahtv of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury
) Act, we hold the evidence obtained pursuant
j to the subpoenas duces tecum was admissible
| under the principle set torth in Kruil. The tnai
| court's denial of defendants1 motion to ^uoi press is aifirmed.
j Antitrust and 'Grouo Boycott"
Derendants contend the\ were improperly
I charged with and convicted of conduct in
| violation of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah
* Code Ann. §§76-10-911 througn -926
(1979). This is the first criminal prosecution
under the Utah AnLtmst Act and is thus a
case of first impression. Ihe general provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act are similar in
I many respects to •'heir tederal coanterparts in
! the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 througn 7
(1987). Section 76-10-926 provides, "The
legislature intends that the courts, in construing this act, will be guided by interpretations
I given bv the federal courts to comparaoie
federal antitrust statutes and by other state
courts to comparable state antitrust statutes '
Section 76-10-914(1) of the Utah Antitrust Act, like section 1 of rhe Sherman Act,
states. "Every contract, combination m tne
form ot trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce is declared to
be illegal.' Section 76-10-920 furtner provides:
Any person who violates section 7610-914 by price fixing, oid rigging,
j
agreeing among competitors to
|
divide customers or territories, or
j
by engaging in a group boycott with
I
specific intent ot eliminating competition shall be punisned, if an
individual, by a fine not to exceed
$50,000 or by imprisonment for an
indeterminate time not to exceed
one year, or botn or, if bv a person
„other than an individual, a fine not
to exceed SI00,000.
Defendants point out there are three elements to the otfense charged in the instant case:
(A) a contract, combination, or conspiracy m
restraint of trade in violation of sect.cn ^6I 10-914; VB) in the torrn or a group ooycott;
and (C) with specific intent to eliminate competition.
(A)
Defendants argue federal courts uniformly
have reiused to find commercial bnoery to be
a contract, combination, oi conspiracy in
violation of section i ot the Sherman Act.
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Commercial bribery is defined in Utah Code
Ann. $76-6-508(b) (1978) as follows:
A person ... without the consent of
the employer or principal, contrary
to the interests of the empiover or
principal ... confers, offers, or
agrees to confer upon the employee,
agent, or fiduciary of an employer
or principal anv benetit with the
purpose of influencing the conduct
of the employee, agent, or fiduciary
in relating to his employer's or
principal's affairs[.]
In United States v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 380 U.S. 157, 162 (1965), the United
States Supreme Court held, "[I]t is doubttul
that this indictment ... alleges anything more
in suostance than a bribe. Bribery might well
be m the family of offenses covered under a
conflict of interest statute. But it is more
remote from an antitrust frame of reference."
In Calneucs Coru. v. Volkswagen of America.
Inc.. 532 F.Zd 674, 687 f9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied. 429 U.S. 940 (1976), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals held,
'[Commercial
bribery, standing aione, does not constitute a
violation of the Sherman Act." Ana in Municipality of Ancnorags v Hitachi Cable. Ltd.,
547 F. Suop. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982), the
court held, "Commercial bribery does not in
itself constitute a violation of the Sherman
Act."
While it is true that commercial bribery
alone is not conduct in violation of federal
antitrust law, "[wjhen the briber/ is coupled
with other acts tending to restrain trade, a
claim under the Sherman Act mav be established/' Hitactu, 5&1 F. Supp. at 645; see also
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways,
Inc.. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980). In the
cases cited by defendants, there was no evidence of any affirmative acts, coupled with the
bribery, to restrain trade. In the instant case,
however, the prosecution presented substantial
evidence of other affirmative acts in restraint
of trade, e.g., Fletcher's refusal to accept
proposals from other security guard companies.
The dissent suggests that, under the majority opinion's view, every commercial bribery
in which the payee performs his end ot the
bargain would be an antitrust violation. Such
is not the case. Commercial bribes paid to an
employee, agent, or fiduciary of UP&L could
be for other purposes, including rate adjustments, waiver of service fees, and waiver of
safety requirements. Such purposes are clearly
not in restraint of trade or anticompetitive.
Furthermore, had derendants paid Fletcher the
bnbes in order to influence him to deal exclusively with them only alter he had received
other K ins. their actions arguably would not
have oeen a conspiracy entered into primarily
to eliminate competition or restrain trade.

(B)
Defendants next argue their alleged agreement with Fletcher did not constitute a group
boycott, and, therefore, the prosecution failed
to establish the second element ot the offense.
Federai courts have long held that wnether a
particular action or agreement violates the
Sherman Act depends on wnether it is an
unreasonable restraint on trade. Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. United States. 246
U.S. 231 (1913). In Chicago Board of Trade.
the United States Supreme Court established
the "rule of reason' standard to determine
whether a restraint was unreasonaoie:
To determine that question the
court must, ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to
which the restraint is applied; its
condition before and aiteF the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint, and its effect, actual
or prooable. The history of the
restraint, the evil believed r.o exist,
the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end
sought to be attained, are ail relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the
reverse; but because knowledge of
intent may heip the court to interpret facts and to predict consequences.
fd. at 238. In other words, "the factfinder
[must] decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the restrictive practice
imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition. ' Arizona v. Mancova County Med.
Soc, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982).
While federal courts have utilized the ruie of
reason in determining the legality of most
restraints alleged to be in violation of the
Sherman Act, they have also, by experience,
been able to categorize certain business practices or relationships as per se unreasonable.
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1953), the United States
Supreme Court held, *[T]here are certain
agreements or practices wnicn because of their
pernicious effect on competition and lack of
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and thereiore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise
harm they have caused or the business excuse
for their use." These per se practices include
price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements. Id. Recognition
of the per se rule obviates the costly and
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However, in the instant case, the primary
purpose of the bribes was to restrain trade bv
eliminating ail competition for the UP&L
security contract. The first element of the
offense was therefore established.
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complex litigation a complete rule ot reason
inquiry entails. Id.: see also Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and
Printing Co.. 472 U.S. 284(1985).
Although there is a ''marked lack of uniformitv" 1 among the federal courts in defining
the term group boycott, a classic per se group
boycott exists where two or more competitors
on the same level of the market structure agree
to eliminate a target horizontal competitor by
combining to deny the target of elements
needed m order to compete. Federal Maritime
Comm'n v. Akaebolaget Svenska Amenka
Limen, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1978); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127,
140 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hole
Stores, Inc.. 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). See
also L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of
Antitrust 230 (1977). The restraining agreement need not "entirely exclude its victims
from the m a r k e t / but only "[prevent them]
from making free choices between market
alternatives ....* Associated Gen. Contractors
of California. Inc. v. California State Council
of Carpenters. 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983). It is
the horizontal effect of a group boycott, a
"naked [restraint) of trade with no purpose
except stifling ot competition,' which typically
warrants application of oer se illegality. White
Motor Co. v. United States, 111 U.S. 253, 263
(1963).
Vertical nononce restraints, i.e., comoinations of persons at different levels of the
market structure, are generally not treated
under the per se doctrine but are examined
under the rule of reason standard. Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvsuua Inc., -G3 U.S. 36
(1977). As the United States Supreme Court
hasexDiained:
We do not know enough of the
economic and business stuff out of
which these arrangements emerge to
be certain. They may be too dangerous to sanction or they may be
allowable protections against aggressive competitors or the only practicable means a small company has
for breaKing mto or staying in
business and within the "rule of
reason." We need to know more
than we do about the actual impact
of these arrangements on competition to decide whether they have
such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack ... any redeeming
virtue."
White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263 (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5) (citations
omitted), in Continental T.V., the Court
further explains that while "[vjerticai restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting
the number of sellers of a particular product
comoeung tor the business ot a given group of
buyers ..., [they also! promote inter brand
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i competition bv allowing the manufacturer to
acnieve certain eificiencies in the distribution
of his products.' 433 U.S. at 54.
Under the Sherman Act, both classic grouD
I boycotts and vertical restraints determined
i unreasonable are subject to criminal penalties.
I Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides:
Every person who shall make any
contract or engage in any combinj
ation or conspiracy hereov declared
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty
|
of a felony, and, on conviction
j
thereof, shall be punished by fine
I
not exceeding one million dollars if
j
a corooration, or, if any other
person, one hundred thousand
\
dollars, or by imprisonment not
exceeding three years, or by both
t
said ounishments, in the discretion
of the court.
Section 76-10-920 of the Utah Antitrust
Act, however, criminalizes only the four types
of conduct that have been cieariv labeled as
per se violations of the Sherman Act.2 The
rule of reason analysis has no pan in the criminal provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act.
Therefore, unless defendants' conduct was in
the form of a grouo boycott, it was not criminal under Utah law.
The instant case is not a classic group
boycott. The prosecution claims this is an
arrangement between a group oi horizontal
competitors, i.e., the three defendants. At no
time, however, did anv two of defendants coexist as comoeutors. Rather, they were successive owners of the same security guard
comoany, albeit the company had different
names under different owners. Therefore, :he
alleged agreement between defendants and
Fletcher did not constitute a classic group
bovcott under the federal definition.
However, the group boycott specified in
section 76-10-920 is not the classic group
boycott recognized by federal courts. Under
the classic (per se) grouo boycott definition,
proof of intent and/or effect is not required,
but it is conclusively presumed the boycott is
anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust
laws. Northern Pacific. 356 U.S. at 5. Under
section 76-10-920, the prosecution is required to prove a defendant engaged m a grouo
boycott "witii (the} specific intent of e/fminating competition." When interpreting a statute,
we assume the legislature used each term
advisedly and in its proper sense. Home v.
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utan App. 1937);
Stare v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah
1987). We construe the statute 'on the assumption ... that the intent of the Legislature is
revealed in the use of the term in the context
and structure in which it is placed." Ward v.
Richfield Citv, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utan 1984),
By requiring a separate element of * specific
intent of eliminating competition," the legisi-
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ature cieariv did not aaopt the classic group
bovcott definition formulated by the federal
courts
The term group ooycott as used b> the Utah
state legislature more closely resembles the
general definition of boycott, "a metnod of
pressuring a party with wnom one has a
dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to
withhold, patronage or services from the
target." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v.
Born, 438 U S. 531, 541 (197*) In the instant
ca^e. defendants, through bribes, enlisted
Fletcner to retuse any bids trom their competitors, the targets of the boycott. A group
boycott under the Utah Antitrust Act requires
at least two conspirators, but neither the
numoer of bo>cotters nor their market re'ationshiD with the target is determinative of criminal Lability. Rather, the intent of the contract, combination, or conspiracy is the deciding element.
The dissent proposes an alternative interpretation of section 76-10-920, suggesting the
specific anticompetitive intent element is intended to narrow tne scope of the teaerai definition ot a classic group bovcott. The dissent
also suggests the majority opinion fails to
consider the anticompetitive effect of defendants' actions in the relevant marketplace. In
essence, the dissent suggests we adopt the
classic per se definition ot group ooycott but
that we use the rule ot reason in evaluating the
elements ot proof. Federal courts have consistently held that classic group boycotts
include, by detimtion, the elements of anticompetitive intent and eifect in the relevant
marketplace. See National Collegiate Athletic
Ass'n v. Board ot Resents ot Univ. of Oklahoma. 463 V.S 35, 103 (1984) ("Per se riles
are invoked wnen surrounding circumstances
make the likelihood of anticompetitive
conduct so great as to render unjustified
further examination of the challenged
conduct."). It makes no sense to adopt the
classic per se definition of group boycott and
then to require proot of anticompetitive intent
and market effect. We therefore cannot accept
the dissent's interpretation ot section 76-10920.
Our interpretation of the Utah Antitrust Act
is in une with a current trend in federal case
law to focus not on the form of the conspiracy, but on the intent of the conspirators. In
Continental T.V., the United States Supreme
Court, after establishing the rule of reason
analysis as the general standard for vertical
restraints, stated "we do not foreclose the
possibility that particular applications of vertical restrictions might justify per se pronioition." 433 U.S. at 58. increasingly, federal
court* are recognizing per se group ooycotts
between a single horizontal competitor and a
vertically related company. See Cascade
Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet and Millwork. 710 F.2d 1366 (9th O r . 1983); Com-

39

Teh Inc. v. DuKane Corp , 669 F 2d 404 (6th
Cir. 1982); Corev v. Look, 641 F 2d 32 (1st
C r . 1981) See also Sullivan, Antitrust, at 231
n 1, Decker, The Numerosity Requirement For
Croup Boycotts: Toward a Horizontal Benefit
Analysis, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev. 577 (1984), Bauer,
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to
Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 7 9
Colum. L. Rev. 689 (1979). These cases and
commentators urge tnat when applying the per
se rule to a group ooycott, tne xey mauines
snould not be the numoer or nature of the
conspirators, but their intent and/or the
effect ot the restraint on competition. No logic
supports ignoring defendants' anticompetitive
conduct in the instant case soiely because they
failed to recruit a second horizontal competitor into their conspiracy. See Decxer, The
Numerosnv Reauirement, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev at
587 ("[I]f a single firm nas the necessary influence to effectuate an exclusionary boycott
with a supplier or customer, sucn conduct
should not escape the per se ruie simply
because that firm did not comnine with others
at its own market Jevei to exert its influence."). Althougn the coercive pressure was
applied vertically, the stifling of competition
was horizontal. Com-TeL Inc.. 669 F 2d at
409. A conspiracy in the iorm of a group
boycott was therefore establisned.
(C)
Under our interpretation of sections 76-10914 and -920, therefore, the group boycott
involving defendants and Fletcher would be
criminal upon a proper showing of a specific
intent to eliminate competition. When the
specific intent or a defendant is an element of
the criminal offense charged, the intent mav
be inferred from the defendant's conduct and
surrounding circumstances. State v. Fowter,
745 P.2d 472, 475 (Utan Aop. 1987); State v.
Kennedy, 616 P 2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980). In
the instant case, not one of the contracts
between UP&L and defendants was competitively bid. Representatives of other large
companies testified the usual course of action
wnen selecting a security guard company is
open bidding. Several representatives of other
security guard companies testified their attempts to submit bid proposals to Fletcner were
either refused or ignored. Sufficient evidence
was presented to the jury ro infer a specific
intent ot eliminating competition on the part
of defendants. The third element of the
offense was clearly established.
We hold defendants were properiy charged
with engaging m a cnminai group boycott
under sections 76-10-914 and -920 Under
our interpretation of the Utan Antitrust Act,
an individual is clearly on notice that if he (or
she) engages in a contract, comomanon, or
conspiracy in restraint of trade, with tne specific intent of ehminatmg comvetition, regardless of who his co-consoirators are, he will
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be criminally liable.
Because there is some evidence, mc'uding
reasonable inferences, to support every
element of the jury's verdict, we will not
disturb it on aDpeal Srafe v Garcia, 744 P 2d
1029 (Utah App. 1987). Defendants' convictions on the antitrust counts are affirmed.
Racketeering and 'Pattern' 1 of Activity
Detenaants argue they were improperly
charged with and convicted of conduct in
violation ot the Utah Racketeering Infljences
and Criminal Enterprise Act, Utah Code Ann.
§§76-10-1601 through -1608 (1981) (the
RICE Act). When this case was tried, section
76-10-1603(1) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person
who has received any proceeds
derived, ^nether directly or indirectly, from a pattern ot racketeering
activity m which such person has
participated, as a principal, to use
or invest, directly or indirectiv, any
part oi sucn proceeds, or the pioceeds derived from the investment or
use thereof, in the acquisition or
any interest in, or the establishment
or operation ot, any enterprise.
A "pattern of racketeering activity' was
defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as.
engaging in at least two episodes of
racketeering conduct which have 'he
same or similar objectives, results,
participants, victims, or methods ot
commission, or are otnerwise interrelated ov distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events,
provided at least one of such episodes occurred atter the effective
date of this part and the last of
which occurred within rive years
after the commission of a prior
episode or racketeering conduct. 3
Violation of the RICE Act is a second degree
felonv punishable by uo to 15 years imprisonment, a fine of 510,000, and forieiture of all
property associated with the racketeering enterprise.
Defendants first contend the RiCL Act,
patterned atter the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S C. §§1961 through 1968 (1984) (the
RICO Act), was enacted to prevent the infiltration of organized crime into Utah. Therefore, defendants argue, the RICE Act should
extend onlv to cases involving oifenses committed by organized crime.
Although the legislative histories of both the
RICE and RICO Acts suggest they were intended to apply to persons engaged in a c s traditionally associated with organized crime, a
nexus to organized crime was not included as
an element of the oifense. The United States
Supreme Court concluded that the RICO Act

applies to "any person" who engages in
conduct the Act forbid > Sedima. S P R.L v
Imiex Co , /lie. 473 U S 479, 105 S Ct 3275,
3285 (1985) Similarly, we hold Utah's RICE
Act is not limited in aophcation to persons
arfiliated with organized crime
Detendants contend that not limiting application ot the RICE Act to serious and aggravated offenses by organized crime renders the
Act unconstitutionally vague. Vagueness is a
question of procedural due process, namely
"whether the statute adequately notices the
proscribed conduct.' State v Frarnpton, "31
P 2 d 183. 192 (Utah 1987). Defendants claim
without requiring that the conduct proscribed
demonstrate characteristics traditionaiiv associated with orgamzed crime, the RICE Act
does not specincailv define tor persons of
ordinarv intelligence the outer perimeter ot
acceptable conduct. Stats v Owens, 638 P.2d
1182, 1183 (Utah 1981). The RICE Act proscribes the use of proceeds derived from a
pattern ot racketeering activity in an enterprise. Under the s t a t u t e , "^enterprise,'
"racketeering activity," and "pattern of racketeering activity" are all clearly defined
"Episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann }761-101 (1978). We hold that the RICE Act is
"sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary
reader what conduct is prohibited," and is
theretore not unconstitutionally vague. Stare
v. Theobald. 645 P 2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982).
Under section "6-10-1602(l)(h), bnber>
was included as an act of racketeering, sometimes referred to as a predicate act.4 Defendants argue chat using commercial bnoery, a
class 8 misdemeanor punishable by up to six
months in tail and a fine ot up to $299, to
satisfy the RICE Act requirement or predicate
offenses violates 'he constitutional restraint
against disproportionate pumsnment. In reviewing a claim ot disproportionate punishment,
the question is "whether the sentence imposed
in proportion to the offense committed is such
as to shock the moral sense ot ail reasonable
men as to wnat is right and proper under the
circumstances ' State v. Hanson. 627 P 2d 53
56 (Utah 1981) (quoting State v Nance. 20
Utah 2d 372, 438 P 2d 542, 544 (1963))
Defendants' argument ignores the additional elements required under the RICE Act,
i.e., a pattern of racketeering activity, existence of an enterprise, and use of proceeds
derived from the racketeering activity to establish, acquire, or operate the enterprise
Detendants claim these elements are lllusorv
We disagree It is not the commercial briberies
that are being punisned in the present case,
but the broader conduct which is forbidden bv
the RICE Act. Cf. United States v Field, 432
F. Supp. 55 (S D N.Y. 1977), j / f J 578 F 2d
1371 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert, dismissed, 439 U S.
801 (1978) (Congress entitled to make pattern
of racketeering an independent criminal
offense ounisnaole Tiore severely than simoiv
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twice the penaity for each constituent offense).
We do not find defendants3 sentences for the
RICE violations
unconstitutionally
"shocking."
Defendants also argue the use of misdemeanors as predicate acts under the RICE Act is
inconsistent with Utah's habitual criminal
s t a t u t e , Utah C o d e A n n . §76-8-1001
(1978), and the enhancement provision of the
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utan Code
A n n . §58-37-S(l)(b)(iii) (1987). Under
section 76-8-1001, upon proof that a person
has Deen twice convicted, sentenced, and
committed for a felony, one of which is at
least of the second degree, the person may be
sentenced as a habitual criminal for a period
of five years to life. Under section 5S-378(l)(b)(iii), upon a second conviction for
production or distribution of a controlled
suostance, a class A misdemeanor, a person is
guilty of a third degree felony.
The RICE Act is not inconsistent with these
criminal provisions. The RICE Act does not
simpiy punish multiple violations of statutes
prohibiting the acts enumerated in section 7610-1602(1). Instead, the RICE Act punishes
participation in a pattern of racketeering activity bearing the required relationship to an
enterprise. See subsections 76-10-1603(1)
through (4).
Finally, defendants argue the evidence at
trial failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. "Pattern of racxeteering activity"
was defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as "at
least two episodes of racketeering conduct
which have the same or similar objectives,
results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or are otherwise interrelated by
distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events ...." Defendants claim the several
counts of bribery of which they were convicted
were, as a matter of law, part of only a single
episode oi racketeering conduct and thus
cannot establish a pattern. In support of their
argument, defendants cite several federal cases
involving civil claims under the RICO Act.
The federal definition of a pattern of racketeering activity differs significantly from the
definition of the same term in section 76-101602(4).5 Federal cases which elaborate on the
federal definition of "pattern of racketeering
activity'' are, however, helpful in our analysis.
Federal case law after Sedima has attempted
judicially to refine the definition of "pattern
of racketeering activity" of the RICO Act.
Those cases have emphasized the concepts of
"continuity pius reiatedness" discussed in
Sedima. Against this backdrop, some federal
courts have fashioned requirements that there
be "multiple schemes* or "multiple criminal
episodes" rather than several acts to accomplish a single criminal objective in order to
establish a pattern of racketeering activity.
- The case of Torwest DBC. Inc. v. Dick, 628
F.Sunp. 163 (D. Colo. 1986), cited by defensor comoutc Ulan COQC Annotations,
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dants, alleged multiple acts of mail/wire
fraud in connection with a single scheme to
defraud. The district court held that no
pattern existed where the defendants' conduct
had a singie purpose, a single result, one set of
participants, a singie victim, and one method
of commission. The district court thus concluded there was "no continuity and, therefore,
no pattern of racketeering activity/ Id. at
166. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed, but differentiated the case from one
where "the RICO claim is based on one
scheme involving one victim, but the plan
contemplates open-ended fraudulent activity
and does not have a single goal that, when
achieved, will bring the activity to an end."
Torwest DEC, Inc.\. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929
(10th Cir. 1987). Other federal courts have
noted that an ongoing scheme involving the
same perpetrators, victims, and method of
commission may in itself demonstrate a sufficient pattern of racketeering activity. See
Thomnson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc., 652
F.Supp. 1222, 1227-23 (D. Utah 1987); Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland National Bank,
638 F.Supp. 118, 123 (D. Md. 1986) ("A more
flexible and accurate approach to identifying
patterns may be to require either 1) more than
one scheme or 2) an open-ended continuous
scheme which contains a multiplicity of predicate acts.").
We conclude the RICE Act's definition of
pattern requires separate but related criminal
episodes as the basis for a pattern. We aiso
conclude that the facts of the case before us
satisfy the requirement of separate but related
criminal episodes suggested by the federal
cases and implicit in the definition of pattern
of racketeering activity contained in section 7610-1602(4). Defendants were each charged
with seven different bribes paid in approximately two week intervals between February and
May 1983. Ajn episode is defined in section 761-401 as "all conduct which is closely related
in time and is incident to an attempt or an
accomplishment of a singie criminal objective." The trial court instructed the jury as
follows:
If you should find one or more of
the defendants guilty of bribery,
you must then determine whether
the seven identified payments constitute seven separate bribes, or a
series of payments on a single bribe.
If you find beyond a reasonable
doubt that each of the payments
was made with a distinct and separate purpose, then there are separate bribes. On the other hand, if
the evidence does not convince you
beyond a reasonable doubt that the
payments were made with different
purposes, then such payments constitute one bribe.
COOE«CO'S Annotation service
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Defendants argue the seven payments were
in furtherance of a single criminal objective
and therefore constituted a single episode.
Determining the existence of a single offense
or multiDle offenses is a Question ot intent to
be determined by the particular tacts ana circumstances of each case. State v. KlmbeU 620
P.2d 515, 513 (Utah 1980). Althougn the
overail scheme was to maintain defendants*
exclusive contract with UP&L, there was evidence to support the jury's finding a separate
purpose for eacn bribe, i.e., Fietcner's hiring
of defendants' company before execution of a
contract, his recommendations to UP&L
management, and his refusal to consider other
bids. The fact the jury convicted defendants
on only five of the seven bribery counts indicates they considered the facts and circumstances of each payment individually and made
a determination as to each. As there is evidence to support the jury's findings, we will
not disturb them on aopeal. Garcia, 744 P.2d
at 1030.
Defendants' convictions of violations of the
RICE Act are affirmed.
Miscellaneous Issues
Defendants ah>o argue their bribery convictions should be reversed because the trial court
erred in not instructing the jury that an illegal
bribe must be paid with criminal intent. The
trial court instructed the jury as follows:
Before you can convict any defendant for bribery you must find
beyond a reasonable doubt each
and every one of the following elements:
(1) That the defendant or defendants in Salt Lake County, State of
Utah:
(2) On or about the date or dates
alleged in the Iniormanon;
(3) That the defendant or defendants conferred, offered or agreed to
confer upon L. Brent Fletcher a
benefit:
(4) That this benefit was conferred
or offered with the purpose of influencing the conduct of Mr. Fletcher in relating to the affairs of
Utah Power and Light contrary to
the interests of Utah Power and
Light and without its consent;
(5) That the defendant or defendants offered or conferred or agreed
to confer the benefits, if any, knowingly, intentionally or willfully as
those terms are defined in these
instructions.
We believe the instruction sufficiently
advised the jury on the law. Both the statute
and the instruction unpucitly require a criminal intent by requiring a showing of conduct
contrary to the interests of and without tne
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consent of the emDJoyer or principal. See Stale
v. O'Netil, 103 Wash.2d 353, TOO ?.2d 711
(1985). Defendants' convictions of bribery are
affirmed.
Defendants next argue the tnai court made
prejudicial errors in the admission of certain
evidence. Even assuming the trial court did
err, defendants have failed to show the challenged evidence had a substantial influence in
bringing about the verdict. Therefore, the
errors, if any, were not prejudicial. Utah R.
Evid. 103; State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 448
(Utah 1986).
Finally, defendants argue the trial court
erred in not granting a mistrial after two witnesses mentioned the Fletcner trial ana one
juror told the court she had read of Fletcher's
conviction in the newsoaper during the trial.
With regard to motions for mistnai, the Utah
Supreme Court has stated:
The critical inquiry should be
whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the incident so prejudiced the jury that in its absence
there might have been a different
result. Due to his advantaged position and consistent with his responsibilities as the authority m charge
of the trial, the inquiry is necessarily addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. He should
view such an episoae in the light of
the total proceeding, and if he
thinks that there has been such
prejudice that there is a reasonaole
probability that the defendant
cannot have a fair and impartial
determination of his guilt or innocence, he should of course grant a
mistrial. But inasmuch as this is his
primary responsibility, when he has
given due consideration and ruled
upon the matter, this court on
review should not upset his ruling
unless it clearly appears that he has
abused his discretion.
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d
1322, 1324 (Utah 1974} (footnote omitted).
Defendants have failed to show any clear
abuse of the trial court's discretion. The trial
court and counsel both questioned the juror.
The juror indicated the fact of Fletcher's
conviction had no impact on her deliberations
and was not discussed with the other jury
members. Furthermore, the trial court adequately instructed the jury to only consider the
evidence introduced at trial. The denial of
defendants' motion for a mistnai is affirmed.
The jury verdict on ail counts is affirmed.
Russell W. Bench, Judge
I CONCUR:
Richard C. Davidson, Judge

For complete uuti Code ADDOUIUOBS. ^oosmt CODE^CO'S Annotauoo Service

77 UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
1 St Paul fire Jc Manns Ins. Co v Barry, 438
US ^31.543(1978)
2 In contrast to the Sherman Act, the Utah Anturust -\u 'attempts to oroviae ooth the prosecutor
ana the community at large with a clear definition
ot vvnat ^onduct i^ criminally proscnred.' J Dibble
& J Jaraine, The Utah Antitrust Act ot 1979
Getting Inro The State Antitrust Business, 1980
UtanL Rev 73, S3
3 In i°S7, the state legislature substantial!/ revised
the RICE Act and renamed it the 'Pattern oi Unlawrul Acti*uv Act ' After the 1987 revision, 'at
least three episoaes ot unlawtul activity" are now
requred
4 ratter the 1987 revision, section 76-10-1602
now lists the several statutory types or bnoery inawiauailv, including commercial bribery under
section "6 t>-5QS
5. 18 U S C §1961(5) defines 'pattern ot racketeering activity is "at least two acts or racketeering
activit\
* This definition has been tne subject or
consiucraoie judicial attention following the landmark United States Supreme Court decision in
Sedima. S P R.L v. Imrex Co , Inc., 473 U S 479,
'05 ^ Cc :2~5 (1985) n its now ramous iootnote
14, ihe Court noted the lack ot specificity in the
federal detinition ot pattern ot racketeering activity.
After a Driet discussion ot suggestions in the legislative historv that "pattern' connotes 'continuity
plus retationsnip' rather than merely an enumeration or acts, the Court observed*
Significantly, in detimng "pattern' in a
later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlightening* "criminal
conauct forms a pattern if it emoraces
criminal acts that have tne same or
similar purposes, results, paniciDants,
victims, or methods ot commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing cnaractensucs and are not isolated
events * 18 U S.C. }3575(e) This language may be usetul m interpreting
other sections ot the Act.
105 S.Ct at 32S5 The pattern definition noted by
the Supreme Court is suostantiailv identical to the
detinition contained in the RICL Act. Thus, the
pattern analvsis under the RICE Act does not
operate trom the j>ame sparse language of the RICO
Act
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part)
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I ^nows derenuants' intent was stnctlv to line
their own pockets and not, in any sense, r o
i eliminate competition.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY
I do not view Utah's antitrust statute as the
appropriate vehicle for bringing commercial
bribery charges. In addressing this issue, the
trial court properly recognized the Roomson. Patman Act as tne veniue unuer wmen tederai
commercial bribery charges are typically
brougnt. 1 The court interpreted the Legisia| ture's failure to incorporate a Rooinsoni Patman Act as evidencing an intent to make
] Utah's antitrust statute the appropriate vehicle
for charging commercial bnberv. I believe the
fairer interpretation is that the Legislature
deliberately tailed to incorporate the RobinsonPaiman-tvpe act into our antitrust statute
| because it recognized tnat Utah already has a
| specific vehicle for prosecuting commercial
J bribery, nameiv the commercial bnberv
j statute. Utah Coae Ann. }76-6-5CS U978).
J Even assuming that commercial bribery is
j properly charged under r he Utah antitrust
statute, the majority concedes tne onpery must
be coupled wuh other acts intended to restrain
trade in order to estaoush a violation While
the majority recognizes the principle that
f commercial bnoery, without more, does not
violate the antitrust laws, it onlv otfers Fletcher's unilateral reiusal to accept proposals
from other security companies as the 'more'
which is necessary to turn an otherwise garoenvanety bnpe into an antitrust violation,
f However, any agreement to deal exclusive!>
1 wuh one party necessarily involves a retusal to
[ deal with other parties. See. e.g., Construction
Aggregate Trans, v. Florida ROCK Ina. Inc.,
710 ?.2d 752, 776 (1933) (every exclusive
dealing arrangement necessarily involves the
exclusion of an entity whicn operates on tho.
j same market level). At least absent evidence of
other illegal conduct, the defendants' payment
of bribes did not consume a contract, combination, or conspiracy in violation ot the antitrust statute. Fletcher's refusal to engage tne
I services of defendants' competitors was
I merely tne bargained lor object of *ne snoes
j in question. Under tne majority's view I notwithstanding the claim that more than a
I typical commercial bribe is required - ess! entially every commercial bribe would be an
i antitrust violation if onlv the payee perlormed
his or her end of the bargain.

While i otherwise tully concur in the majority opinion, I disagree with the result
reached and portions of the analvsis in the
section entitled "Antitrust and 'Group
Bovcott'."
As the majority states, there are three eiements of the antitrust oifense as charged m
this cise* (I) a contract, comomation or conspiracy in restraint ot trade: (2) m the torm of j
a group boycott; ana (3) with specific intent to
eliminate competition. I simply do not believe
that the^e elements have been met. My disag- j
reement >vith my colleagues is quite complete. I
I believe defendants' conduct constituted I
simcie commercial bnoerv. I believe their '
conduct can in no way be property characterized as a group boycott, f believe the evidence ,

|
I

GROUP BOYCOTT
As the majority ooser\es, under §76-10920 of the Utah Antitrust Act, onlv four spe
cific antitrust violations, "clearly labeled as
per se violations of the Sherman Act," are
criminal offenses in Utah. Defendants in tnis
case were charged with having committed only
one such violation, namely a group boycott.
As the majority states, the Legislature inte-
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nded that teaeral interpretations be considered
in construing the Utan statute where appropriate however, unlike .vith the Snerman Act,
the Utah statute was aesigred to unambiguously define antitrust violations whicn will give
rise iO cr mmal sanctions in th s ^cate bee
Dibbie <&. Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of
1979 Getting Into the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utah L. Rev 7 3 , 83 The majontv
concedes tnat f re agreement between defendants and Fletcher did not constitute a classic
group oovcott under 'he tederal detmition ana
that "uniess defendants' conduct was n the
form or a grouo boycott, it was not criminal
under Utan iaw '
Notwithstanding the specific language of the
statute Gictaung the ase ot federal mteipretations and the objective of e'early delineating
proscnoed conduct, the majority suggests that
the U u n statute rejects me traditional tederal
dennmon of the 'emi "group ooycott" m
favor ot the "general definition of bovcott y%
This concept, according to the majoruy, reiers
to "a method ot pressuring a party with wnom
one has a disoute oy withholding, or enlisting
others to withhold, patronage or services trom
the target ' 3 Even under this definition it is
difficult to imagine now the benavior ot these
defendants constitutes any kind of boycott
witn antitrust implications Fletcher accented
bribes rrom the defendants in this case so that
thev wouid receive the UP&L becumv contracts There was no disoute, no pressure, no
enlistment of others to witnhold services, and
no target tor elimination It is clear co me tnat
even if the Legislature meant to have r r e term
* group oovcott' ^oustruea m a less rigid way
than might cnaractenze the traditional redcrai
view, it nonetneless intended to nave the term
mean something reasonably concrete Minimally, the benavior sought to be proscribed by
the statute is behavior .vhicn can tairiy be
descnoed as a srouo bovcott
In my view, rvhat defendants aid cannot be
characterized as a group bovcott in any sense.
Defendants' excursion into the realm ot antitrust was, at most, in the form ot an exclusive
dealing arrangement
\n exclusive dealing
arrangement is a contract which involves a
commitment by a buyer to deal oniv vith a
particular seller L. Sullivan, HandbooK ot the
Law or Antitrust 471 (1977) However, -»uch
an arrangement does not constitute a per se
violation of section I of the Sherman Act, see,
e.g., Twin dty Sponservice, Inc. v Chanes
O. Fmlev & Co , 676 F 2d 1291, 1304 rt.9 (<Hh
Cir. 1982) (explaining Tampa Electric Co. v.
Nasnville Coal Co , 365 U.S 320, SI S Ct 623
(1963)), nor does it constitute a violation ot
§76-10-920 ot the Utah Antitrust Act.
The trial court accurately categorized the
arrangement between Fletcher and the defendants m this case as one of "exclusive
dealing, * wrule at the same time stating that
application of ' r u l e of reason" analvsis 4
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" vould result in an unconstitutional deprivation ot defendant : rights to due process oi
law 5 The majority uke vise admits that 'the
rule ot reason has no pan in the criminal
provisions of the Utah Antitrust A c t /
The majoruv, nowever, iargeiv avoids the
implications of this conclusion by minimizing
the nature of defendants
behavior ana
instead empnasizing then perceived state ot
mind m doma wnat they aid. According to the
majority, "the intent of the contract, comoination or consmracv is the deciding element"
of criminality under this reasoning, even a
purely vertical exclusive deanng contract —
which both the majority ana the trial court
acknowledge is not a "grouo oovcott" m the
usual sense — can oe miraculously converted into a group bovcott, at least ot the Utah
varietv, by prooi ot an anncomoetmve intent
That is, as the trial court held, "an otnerwise
legal business decision can become an unlawful group boycott under the Utah Antitrust
Act.'
The effect of this aDproach is to render
totailv ineffectual the Legislature's eifort to
particularize but tour tammar, per se antitrust
violations as uniawiul under §76-10-Q20,
so that 'both the prosecutor and the community at large' will ciearly know 'what conduct
is criminally proscnoed." Dioble dc Jardine, The
Utah Antitrust Act of 1979 Getting Into
the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utan L.
Rev 73, 83 (emohasis added)
3ut why else, the logic goes, would the
Legislature inject a sDecmc mtent reamrement
'pro in offense wruch '•as nistoncailv Seen
thougnt so bad thai criminal intent can simoiy
be presumed^ It is oovious to me that oy
coupling an anticompetitive specific intent
requirement with the group oovcott aspect ot
§76-10-920, the Legislature did not mean
to obscure the issue of wnat ;cinds ot benavior
were proscnoed. Rather, the Legislature meant
to avoid the 'contusion over the illegality of
group boycotts and the governing standards/
id., by requinng that a readily identifiable
group boycott be accompanied by an actual
intent to eliminate competition See id. The
specific intent requirement *as added to eliminate "the potentially problematic situation
where a grouo bovcott exists out an anticompetitive motive does not." Id. The requirement
was not added to allow tor a cnminai conviction wtienever there is an anticompetitive
motive regardless ot wrtether there is reallv a
grouo boycott. I oehe v e by adding a ^pecirc
intent requirement the Legislature meant zo
narrow, nor expand, the scope ot the group
boycott enme in this state.
SPECIFIC INTENT
Even if the defendants engaged in conduct
which might arguaolv consntute a group
boycott in some oroad sense, I do not oeiieve
they did so with the specific intent to eliminate
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competition as required bv the statute nor do i conduct does not constuute a group boycott.
agree with trie majority that sucn intent can be Even if defendants' conduct can somenow be
shoenorned into rhe 'group ooycott" pigeon.nterrcd trom the evidence
Acccraing to tne maionty, anticompetitive hole, there was no evidence to prove a specific
intent "may be inferred from the deiendant's intent to eliminate competition, and the fair
conduct and ^rcumstances." The maicntv mlerences point the other way. i wouid reverse
points to the tact that the contract between the antitrust convictions ana remand for resUPiLL and defendants were not comoetuively entencing on the otner enmes for wnich aefbid as is the usual practice m selecting security endants were properly convicted.
comoames. This leads my colleagues to tne
Gregorv SC. Orme, Judge
conclusion that the intent ot these aefendants
w a s n o n e o t h e r t h a n to e l i m i n a t e
1. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Art, 15
" com petition. *
U S C A 13(c) (1973), exoressty maxes accenting a
If one looks at what defendants did and "commission' *ithout performing real *onc in
considers the market m which tney did u,& it is j connection with a sale ol gooos illegal unaer tederal
ODvtous thev had no intent to eliminate com- I law
petition. The trial court, in instructing the 2. The majority relies en federal cases rejecting the
7
jury, narrowly defined the relevant market in j "numerosuy reauirement ot grouD boycott tor the
/iew
that
something
less is now needed to constitute
this case as "among \enaors 01 secan'y guard
services to Utah Power ana L i g h t / notwiths- j a gToap ooycott vVhile it is true that tnese cases
tanding the tact that other secunty guard t have drooped the 'numerositv* requirement, i.e.,
companies comoetins for the UP&L contract concern about the number ot consoirators in a
j horizontal reiationsmo, tney nonetneless still recuire
were <n$o competing *or contracts tnrougnout the other elements oi a group oovcott: coneertsa
the state or even worldwide. However, there reiusai to deal, enlistment ol otners". ana a target. See.
»vas no eviaence that tne security needs of e.g.. Com-Tel, Inc. v. Oukane Corp.,. 569
UP&L were somehow so unique that guard F^d 404,414 (6th Or .982)
service -/e n acrs , o r r e * i n " Tzi ^P^LL': CIL.I3. Tils majonty suggests tnat a ooycott unaer une-r
the term grouo
ness ^vere necessanlv different — ana fewer - I 'general definition' differs trom
r
- than guard service vendors generally, wno I ooycott as it evoivea unaer he per <e doctrine,
of course are aole to provide security services j Ironically, their definition was taken from one oi
for everything trom large utilities to retail the landmark cases deiirung a per sc illegal grouo
bovcott. The definition extractea from the Supreme
stores, apartments, warenouses, entireties, Court's opinion was one wnich the Court oriered to
banks, and so on. Nor was there evidence to explain the term "boycott" in common parlance. St.
show tnac UP&L was such a major purcnaser I Paul Fire & Marine ins. Co. v Barry, 433 If.S 531,
in the focai security service market that failure I 545-46(1978).
to secure that contract would necessarily i 4 Whereas grouo boycotts are suoject to a per se
rule ot 'llegantv, exclusive dealing arrangements are
imperii anv of defendants' competitors.
While it can perhaps be inferred that the J tested by a "rule or reason' standard. Twin Cty
defendants intended to eliminate otrer secunty j Sportscrvics. Inc. v. Charles O. Finlev & Co , 676
companies from competition for tne UP&L | F 2d at 1302. The locus or this test is to first find a
relevant market ana then assess wnether competition
contract, d sirnolv cannot be inferred that they has been foreclosed in a substantial snare oi the
intended to eliminate these companies from j relevant market. Antitrust liability is not imposed
competition in any meamngiul marketplace, without oroor of actual harm to competition The
which is what the antitrust laws are designed purpose ot tins test is to determine the anticompetto prevent. 'The Sherman Act was enacted to itive "effects* ot the exclusive contract, *d . rather
protect competition in the marketplace, it was I than the anticompetitive * ntent* as requirea by the
not designed, and has never been interpreted. Utah statute.
to reach ail business practices, unfair or oth- I 5 The memorandum decision is reprinted at Note,
erwise, damaging to individual companies." j Criminal Antitrust Action m Utah: Stats v Flcicncr,
1 8 Y.U. J. Pub. L. 229. 251-55 (1986) The decCascade Cabinet Co v. Western Cabinet & j lsion was written in the context of a denial ot a
Mill*ork. 710 F 2d 1366, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983). motion to dismiss. While the decision simply permOther secunty companies were not hindered by itted the state to proceed to try its caae bet ore a
defendants in competing for secunty guard jurv, the trial court snared the majority's view that
contracts. They were merely depnved of the intent is the controlling element ot a 'grouo
UP^cL contract. While this conduct is certainly boycott* charge.
not commenaaole, 7 "the use ot unfair means
The theme of the cases cited oy botn
resulting in the suostitution of one competitor
parties is that the mere existence oi an
exclusive vertical contract is not a
for another without more does not violate the
'group boycott* prombued bv the antantitrust laws." \Ianutac:uring Rescarcn Com I
itrust *aws. However, the State nas
v. Greenlee Tool Co., 693 F.2d 1037, 1043
I
alleged and should be allowed to prove
( l l t h C i r . 1982).
J
"that the aefendants had specific anticoj
mpetitive intent. This can not be inteCONCLUSION
rred from the mere existence ot an -xc«
Commercial bnbery does not criminally
lusive vertical deal, but by anucompctiviolate the Utah antitrust laws. Detendants'
For complete utan Code Annotations, conduit CODLACO'S Annotation :>crvice
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live, lilegai behavior an otherwise legai
business decision can become an unlawful group oovcott under ihz Utah
Antitrust Act. The State should have the
opportunity to establisn that the defendants nad a bDecmc intent to eliminate
access to the security guard mancet as
the goai of their exclusive dealing and
that no legitimate business purpose or
result was intended.
Id. at 254-sS.
6. *[AJn antitrust policy divorced from market
considerations would lacK anv objective benenmarks ' Conunentai T.V. Inc. v GTE Sylvanma.
Inc., 433 U.S 36. 53 n 21 (1977) Contrary to tne
rraioruv's characterization. I have not urged fullblown market analysis or the ^ort typical wnen
applying the rule or reason. Sucn analysis is indeed
unnecessary wnere an antitrust violation of the per
se vanetv is at issue However, I think a cursory
peek at tne relevant market is instructive m evaluating the likelihood that deiendants nad as tneir
intent the elimination oi competition.
••"-*
7. Fortunately, sucn objectionable conduct is readily
pumsned under our commercial bribery statute.
Where the conduct is especially egregious, it can
also, as in this case, be reacned under tne racxeteenng statute Oerendants did a Dad thing and thev
should suner the consequences. Their pumsnment.
however, should be for iht crimes thsv committed,
not those they might have committed had the Legislature cnosen a different approacn to antitrust criminality.
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CODE* Co

j his convictions on seven counts of bribery, one
count of antitrust violation, and two counts of
racketeering. This appeal was initially filed
with the Utah Supreme Court and was transferred to this Court pursuant to R. Utah S.Ct.
4A We affirm defendant's convictions.
In the comoamon case, Stare v. Thomoson,
11 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ulan Ct. Apo. f Marcn
9, 1988), also filed today, this Court disposed
of deienaant's first two issues on appeal,
I namely 1) the admissibility of evidence ootaj ined pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§77-22| 1 through -3 (1982), and 2) the sufficiency of
| the evidence to allow multiple counts of
' bribery to go to the jury. Therefore, we
! address om\ defendant s third issue on
appeai: whether the Utah Racketeering Influ. ences and Criminal Enterprise Act (the RICE
A c t ) , Utah C o a e A n n . ^§76-10-1601
I througn -1608 (1981), was unconstitutionally
applied ex post facto to defendant.
i
When this case was tried, section 76-101603(1) provided:
j
It shall be uniawiul for anv person
who has receneo any proceeds
j
denved, whether directly or mdirej
ctly, from a pattern ot racketeering
I
activity in wnicn such person nas
j
participated, as a principal, to use
or invest, directly or indirectly, anv
j
part of sucn proceeds, or the proceeds derived irom the in vestment or
use thereot, in the acouisition of
any interest tn. or the establishment
or operation of, any enterprise.
A "pattern of racketeering activity" was
defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as:

engaging tn at least two episodes of
racketeering conduct which have the
same or similar objecives, -esults,
participants, vtctims, or metnous of
commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events,
Before Judges Bench, Davidson and Orme.
provided at least one of such episodes occurred after fhe effective
No. 360353-CA
date of this pan and the !&t of
FILED: March 9, 1983
which occurred within five years
after the commission of a prior
THIRD DISTRICT
episode of racketeering conduct.
Honorable Judith M. Billings
Bribery was an act of racketeering under
section 76-10-1602(I)(h). Defendant was
ATTORNEYS:
charged witn one episode of racketeering actSumner J. Hatch for Appellant.
ivity occurring in 1983. He was convicted of
David L. Wilkinson, Stephen J. Sorenson,
seven counts of bribery, in violation of Utah
Stanley H. Olsen, David J. Schwendiman,
Code Ann. §76-6-J08(l)(b) (1978), occurRobert N. Parrish, Craig Hillam for
ring between February 2S and May 27, 1983.
Respondent.
Defendant was charged with another episode
of racketeering activity occurring between
OPINION
I January 11 and Mav 15, 1979. Count \l oi
I the second amended information alleged derBENCH, Judse:
endant participated in eight other acts of
Defendant L. Brent Fletcher appeals from j bribery during this earlier period. All acts
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
L. Brent FLETCHER,
Defendant and Appellant.

For complete Ctan Code Aaooiauona, cunsuii Coot*Co's Aanouuoa a<r>»ce

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, .papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants ^hall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service iu time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor ->hall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT VIII
Excessive bail &hall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inrlicted.
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

ARTICLE I
DECLAKATION OF RIGHTS

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law.

Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments.]
Excessive bail .shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. .Persons
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor.

Sec. 12, [Eights of accused persons.]
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compol the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf,
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury- of the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the
right to appeal in ail cases. In no instance shall any accused person,
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.]
The right of riie people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the person or thing to be seized.
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PART 9
TRADE AND COMMERCE
Section
76-10-911
76-10-012.
76-10-913.
76-10-914.
76-10-915
76-10-916.

76-10-917.

76-10-918.

76-10-919.

Section
Antitrust Act — Short title
Legislative findings — Purpose ot*
act.
Definitions
Illegal anticompetitive activities.
Exempt activities.
Attornev general's powers — Investigations — Institution of
actions — Cooperation.
Civil antitrust investigations —
Demand for documentary material or information — Production of documents — Oral examination — Judicial order for
compliance — Confidentiality
— Subpoenas precluded.
Attorney general may brinjj action tor injunctive relief, damages or civil penalty
Person may bring action for injunctive relief and damages —

76-10-920.

76-10-921.

76-10-922.
76-10-923.
76-10-924.
76-10-925.
76-10-926.

Treble damages — Recovery of
actual damages or civil penalty
by state or political subdivisions — Immunity of political
subdivisions from
damages,
costs, or attorney's fees.
Fine and/or imprisonment tor violation — Certain vertical agreements exciuaed — Nolo contendere.
Conviction as prima facie evidence in action for injunctive
relief or damages.
Antitrust revolving account.
Attorney general to advocate competition.
Venue of actions by state —
Transfer.
Statute of limitations.
Interpretation of act.

76-10-911.

Antitrust Act — Short title.

This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the 'Utah Antitrust Act."
Historv: C. 1953, To-10-911, e n a c t e d bv L.
1979, ch. 79, * 1.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Untair Practices Act.
5* 13-V1 et sea
L a w R e v i e w s . — Forum-Shopping in Appellate Review or FTC Cease ana j_)esist Orders. 1968 Utan L Rev 316
Antitrust Symposium, 19b9 Utah L Rev
617 et seq
The Utah Antitrust Act ot 1979 Lxr tring into

76-10-912.

the State Antitrust Bubines.-,, 1980 Utah L.
Rev 73
A.L.R. — Propnetv under state law of
manufacturer » nr bupoliers retusai to sell
medical product to individual onvbician. nospital. or cimic 45 A L.R 4tn 1007

Legislative findings — Purpose of act.

The legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the
free marKet system and t h a t the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quaiitv and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, political and social institutions.
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition
in the interest of the general welfare and economv of this state by prohibiting
monopolistic and untair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the
enforcement of its provisions.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-912, e n a c t e d by L.
1979, ch. 79, * 2.

76-10-913.

Definitions.

As used in this act:
(1) ''Attempt to monopolize" means action taken without a legitimate
business puipose and with a specific intent ot destroying competition or
controlling prices to substantially lessen competition, or creating a monopoly, where there is a dangerous probability of creating a monopoly.
(2) "Commodity" includes any product of the soil, any article of merchandise or trade or commerce, and any other kind of real or personal
property
(3) '"Manufacturer" means the producer or originator of any commodity
or service.
(4) "Service" includes any activity that is performed in whole or in part
for the purpose of financial gain including, but not limited to, personal
service, professional service, rental, leading or licensing for use.
(5) "Truae or commerce' includes all economic activity involving, or
relating to, any commodity, service, or business activity, including the
cost of excnange or transportation.
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7G-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities.
( I) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal.
< 2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize,
any part of trade or commerce.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-914, e n a c t e d by L.
1979, ch. 79, § 4.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
ANALYSIS

Agricultural cooperative association.
Illegal price-control agreement of trade corporation.
Proof of violation.
Agricultural cooperative association.
Suit by milk hauler against producers' association raised question for jury whether association had urged members to use only its transportation services to further its own legitimate
business interests or to enable it to fix minimum milk prices; such conduct would be justiliable it for the former purpose, but unlawtui if
for the tatter purpose Gammon v Federated
Milk Producers Assn. (!%.>) L4 U 2d 291. 3h3
Illegal p r i c e - c o n t r o l a g r e e m e n t of t r a d e
corporation.
Where a group of contractors organized a
profit corporation which was to provide essentiai information involving the economics of
their trade and included an agreement to employ a common agent to provide one essential
service in bidding each joh — a common source

76-10-915.

of information for bidding — and where the fee
paid by the members was graduated upward
based on the total bid by a member on a job.
and where the fee was understood to be in addition to the actual job cost with the purpose in
m i n ( j ot - c a r r y i n ? out an investment program
f o r t h e m e m b e r s and paving dividends, the
a K r e e m e n t between the corporation and the
m e m b e r s w a s a n l l l e „ a l p r ice-controi agreem e n t a n d w a s a n u n r e a s o n a b l e restraint of
trade and invalid as against public policy.
Zion's Service Corp. v. Danieison v 1961) 12 U
2d 369, :JG6 P 2d 982.
Proof ot violation.
Proof of combine, conspiracy or agreement
was necessary to establish violation of former
law. Flinco. Inc. v. Goodyear Tire <& Rubber Co.
(1965) 17 U 2d 173, 406 P 2d 911.

Exempt activities.

(1) No provision of this act shall be construed to prohibit:
(a) The activities of any public utility to the extent that those activities
are subject to regulation by the public service commission, the state or
federal department of transportation, the federal energy regulatory commission, the federal communications commission, the interstate commerce commission, or successor agencies;
(b) The activities of any insurer, insurance agent, insurance broker,
independent insurance adjuster or rating organization including, but not
limited to, making or participating in joint underwriting or reinsurance
arrangements, to the extent that those activities are subject to regulation
by the commissioner of insurance;

(c) The activities of securities dealers, issuers or igents, to the extent
that those activities aie suoject to regulation under the laws oi either this
state or the Unired States;
(d) The activities of any state or national banking institution, to the
extent that such activities are regulated or supervised by state government officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or by federal government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the
United States;
(e) The activities of anv state or federal savings and loan association to
the extent t h a t those activities are regulated or supervised bv ^tate government orficers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or federal government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the
United States: or
(f) The activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed
by state law
(2) The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate object thereof: nor shail such organizations or membership in chem be held to be illegal comoinations or conspiracies m restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
Historv: C 195X 76-10-915, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79, * 5.

76-10-918. Attorney general's powers — Investigations —
Institution of actions — Cooperation.
(1) The attorney general ^hall have authority to investigate suspected violations of this act and to institute appropriate actions regarding those suspected violations as provided m this act.
(2) Any violations of this act which may come to the attention of any state
government officer or agency shail be reported to the attorney general. All
state government otficers and agencies shall cooperate with, and assist in, any
prosecution for violation )f this act.
(3) The j t t o r n e y general bhall have the authority to proceed under any
antitrust laws m the federal courts on behalf of this state or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies
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7o-I0-917.

Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for
documentary material or information — Production of documents — Oral examination — Judicial order tor compliance — Confidentiality —
Subpoenas precluded.

(1) Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material,
or mav have any information relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he
may, prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, issue ana cause to
be served upon that person a written civil investigative demand requesting
that person to produce such documentary material for inspection, copying or
reproduction by the state where the documents are located or produced, to
give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to
furnish any combination thereof.
(2) (a) Each such demand shall state:
(i) The nature of the activities constituting the alleged antitrust
violation or the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition,
joint venture, or similar transaction which, if consummated, may
result in a violation of this act which are under investigation and the
provision of law applicable thereto; and
<ii) That the recipient is entitled to counsel, that the documents,
materials, or testimonv in response to the demand may be used in a
civil or criminal proceeding, and that if the recipient does not comply
with the demand the office of the attorney general may compel compliance by appearance, upon reasonable notice to the recipient, before
the district court in the judicial district wherein the recipient resides
or does business and only upon a showing before rhat district court
that the requirements of subsection w) have been met.
(b) If the demand is one for production of documentary material, it
shail also:
(i) Describe the classes of documentary material to be produced
thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit the
material to be fairly identified;
(ii) Prescribe return dates which will provide a reasonable period
of time within which the material demanded may be assembled and
made available for inspection and reproduction; and
(iii) Identify the individual at the attorney general's office to
whom such material shall be made available.
(c) If rhe demand is one for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also
prescribe the date, time and place at which oral testimony shail be commenced and state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall
conduct the examination and that a copy of the transcript of such examination shail be submitted to and maintained by the office of the attorney
general.
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who may
be brought within the jurisdiction of any Utah court and shall be served upon
the person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena.
(4) The production of documentary material in response to a demand served
pursuant to this section shail be made under an affidavit, in such form as the
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demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge
of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that
all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has in
good faith been produced and made available to the office of the attorney
general.
(5) fa) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized
to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United States or of
the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the
testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and
shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his
presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be
taken stenographieaily and transcribed. The officer before whom the testimony is taken shail promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the
testimony to the office of the attorney general.
(b) In the taking of oral testimony, ail persons other than personnel
from the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for" the witness,
the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenographer taking such testimony, snail be excluded from the place where the
examination is held.
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand
served under this section shall be taKen in the county wherein such person resides or transacts business or in such other place as may be agreed
upon by the attorney general and such person.
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed the transcript shall be certified
by the officer before whom, the testimony was taken and submitted to the
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished
free of charge to each such witness upon his request.
(e) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony
pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the
request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to
any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on
the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for
the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be
made, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such
person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any
constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege
against self-incrimination, [f such person refuses to answer any question,
the attorney general may petition the district court for an order compelling such person to answer the question.
(f) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony p u r s u a n t to this section refuses to answer any questions on grounds
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person
may be compelled as in criminal cases under section 77-45-2.
(g) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand
served under this section shall be entitled to the same fees and mileage
which are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the State of Utah.
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Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil
action.
(6) The providing of anv testimony, documents or objects in response to a
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall
be considered part of an official proceeding as defined m section 76-8-501.
(7) If a person objects to, or otherwise fails to comply with the demand
served upon him pursuant to this section, the attorney general may file in the
district court of the county in which the person resides or does business, a
petition for an order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hearing of the petition and a copy of the petition s,hail be served upon the person,
who may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the
demand is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply with
the demand, subject to such modifications as the court may prescribe. Upon
motion by the person and for good cause shown, the court may make any
further order in the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person
from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense.
(8) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless ordered disclosed by the court for good cause shown or confidentiality is waived in writing by the person being investigated or the person who has testified or produced documents or objecLs.
<9> Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the
invocation bv the attorney general of section 77-45-20.
History: C. 195.'{, 7(»-l(M)l7, e n a c t e d by L.
1971), ch. 79, * 7.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — Sections 77-45-2 and
77-45-20. referred tu in Subsections (5x0 and
(9) were repealed in t9S0. For similar provisions in the present law, see Chapter .J2 oi Title 77.

C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Witness fees and
mileage. *§ 21-5-4, 21-5-8, 21-5-10.
Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of
1979: (letting into the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 73, 88-94.

76-10-918. Attorney general may bring action for injunctive relief, damages or civil penalty.
The attorney general may brint^ an action for appropriate injunctive relief,
and for damages or a civil penalty in the name of the state or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies for a violation of this act. The court may
assess for the benefit of the state, a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each violation of the Utah Antitrust Act.
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78-10-919. Person may bring action for injunctive relief
and damages — Treble damages — Recovery of
actual damages or civil penalty by state or political subdivisions — Immunity of political subdivisions from damages, costs, or attorney's fees.
(1) (a) A person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business
or pronerty by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an action
for injunctive relief and damages
(b) Subiect to the provisions of Subsections i3), (4), and (5), the court
shall awara three times the amount of damages sustained, plus the cost of
suit and a reasonable attorney s fee, in addition to granting anv appropriate temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relier
(2) (a) If the court determines that a judgment in the amount of three times
the damages awarded plus attorney's fees and costs will directly cause the
msolvencv of the defendant, the court shall reduce the amount of judgment to the highest sum that would not cause the defendants insolvency.
(b) The court may not reduce a judgment to an amount less than the
amount of damages sustained plus the costs oi .suit and a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(3) The state or any of its political subdivisions may recover the actual
damages it sustains, or the civil penaltv provided by the Utah Antitrust Act,
in addition to injunctive relief, costs of >,uit, and a reasonable aitomev h fee.
(4) No damages, costs, or attorneys fee may be recovered under this section:
(a) from any political subdivision;
(b) from the official or employee of any political subdivision acting m
an official capacity; or
(c) against any person based on anv official action directed bv a political subdivision or its official or employee acting in an official capacity
(5) (a) Subsection (4) does not apply to cases filed before April 27, 1987,
unless the defendant establishes and the court determines that m light of
all the circumstances, including the posture of litigation and the availability of alternative relief, it would be inequitable not to apply Subsection (4) to a pending case.
(b) In determining the application of Subsection (4), existence of a jury
verdict, court judgment, or any subsequent litigation, is prima facie evidence that Subsection t4) is not applicable.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953. 76-10-911), e n a c t e d by L.
1979, ch. 79. * 9; L. 1984, ch. i9, * 2; 1987,
ch. 13, * I.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — The 1984 intendment
deleted ' n u u d m g the atate or anv ot its nautical itwdivisions or agencies" after ' \ person '
in un^ec <l). and '-ewrote sunder (3) which
read: 'Neither the state nor anv of its political
subdivisions or agencies shall recover more
than the amount of damages sustained by reason oi a violation or ihis together with costs of
auit ind l /easonaoie lttornevs tee
The 1987 amendment divided the provisions
of former Subjection il) into present Subsec-
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tions a Ma) and (1Kb), substituting 'the Utah
Antitrust Act" for this a r t ' and deleting ' ipp r o p n a t e ' following 'an action for' and "and
the court shall" following 'and damage1- ' in
Subjection i l)(a» and substituting Subventions
(3), <4). <md «5»." for "Subsection i.i»". inserting
'•he touit snail uwaid three times the amount
of damages sustained, plus the <ost or suit and
a reasonable attorneys fee' and deleting
"awaid three times the amount ot damages
sustained, plus the costs ot suit and a reasonable attornev s tee" following 'permanent injunctive relict" in Subsection <l)(hi, divided
the provisions or tormer Subsection i2) into

present Subsections t'iMa) and (jMh), makinu
minor chanuc-s throughout (ho.se provisions.
and added present Subsections (4) and (f>».
L a w Reviews. — A ^urvev of Injunctive Keiief Under State AIU\ Federal Antitrust Laws.
-John J. Flvnn. t9r>7 L'tah L. Kev. .'J44.
A.L.R. — Divestiture as available relief under * 1G ot C'.avton Act ( l.r> l-SCS v 2()> in action by private parties. 77 A.L.R. Fed. 509.
Standing of private party under «? 16 of
Clayton Act ( 15 USCS Ji 2t>) to seek injunction

to prevent merger or acquisition alle^ediv proi
hthited under ^ 7 ot" the Act (15 USCS >
18),
78 A.L.R. Fed. 159.
What constitutes impairment of proposed intervenor's interest to support intervention as
matter or" ntfht under Rule li4(«i)i2) ot Federal
Rules ot Civil Procedure in antitrust actions,
78 A.L.R. Fed. U8f).
Propriety of preliminary injunctive relief in
private antitrust actions involving dealership
terminations, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 14.

DKCISIONS UNDKR FORMER LAW
R e q u i r e m e n t s for r e c o v e r y of t r e b l e d a m aiics.
[n an action to recover treble damages for
injuries compensable under (he former amitrust statutes, piaintitf had to establish a violation of the anti-trust provisions and also that

76-10-920,

the acts constituting such violation proKimalelv caused the damages. Recovery was iimited to those at whom the violation was directly aimed or those who had been directly
harmed. (Jummon v. Federated Milk Producers
Assn. (1963) 14 U 2d 291, t>83 P 2d 402.

Fine and/or imprisonment for violation — Certain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo contendere-

1(1)1 Any person who violates section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid rigging,
agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or by engaging
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition shall be
punished, if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $50,000 or by imprisonment
for an indeterminate time not to exceed one year, or both or, if by a person
other than an individual, a fine not to exceed $100,000. The foregoing shall
not be construed to include vertical agreements between a manufacturer, its
distributors or their subdistributors dividing customers and territories solely
involving the manufacturer's commodity or service where the manufacturer
distributes its commodity or service both directly and througii distributors or
subdistributors in competition with itself.
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by
the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the
interest of the public m the effective administration of justice.
History: C. 195:;. 7H-10-920. onacted l>y f,.
1979, c-h. 79, * 10.
Law Reviews. —The Utah Antitrust Act of

1979- Getting info the State Antitrust Bustness, 1980 Utah L. Uev. 7:5. o2-Hf>.

76-10-921. Conviction as prima facie evidence in action for
injunctive relief or damages.
In any action brought by the M.ate. a final judgment or decree determining
that a person has criminally violated this act, other than a judgment entered
pursuant to a nolo contendere plea or a decree entered prior to the taking of
any testimony, shall be prima facie evidence against that person in any action
brought pursuant to section 76-10-919, as to all matters with respect to which
the judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto.
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76-10-922. Antitrust revolving account.
(1) There is created within the general fund an account to be known as the
''antitrust revolving account" for the purpose of providing funds to pay for any
costs and expenses incurred by the attorney general in relation to actions
under state or federal antitrust laws, which account shall lapse only to the
extent that it exceeds the sum of one million dollars.
l2) All monies received by the state or its agencies by reason of any judgment, settlement, or compromise as the result of any such action commenced
by the attorney general, after payment of any costs or fees allocated by the
court, shall be deposited to the antitrust revolving-account except as otherwise provided in this section.
(3) The legislature may make annual appropriations to the attorney general from the antitrust revolving account or from the general fund, to such
extent as may be required for the administration and enforcement of the
antitrust laws. These funds shall be in addition to such other funds as may be
appropriated to the attorney general for the administration and enforcement
of the laws of this state.
(4) Any monies recovered by the attorney general based on an expenditure
or loss from a specific cash fund shall be credited to that fund to the extent of
the expenditure or loss. Any monies recovered by the attorney general on
behaif of any private person or public body other than the state shaii be paid
to such persons or bodies. However, prior to any such credit or payment, any
expenses advanced by the attorney general in any of the above actions shall
be credited to the antitrust revolving account.
History: C. 1953, 7G-10-922, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79, 5 12.

76-10-923. Attorney general to advocate competition.
The attorney general shall have the authority and responsibility to advocate the policy of competition before all political subdivisions of this state and
all public agencies whose actions may affect the interests of persons in this
state.
History. C. 1953, 76-10-923. enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79, $ 13.

76-10-924. Venue of actions by state — Transfer.
Any action brought by the state pursuant to this act shall be brought in any
county wherein the defendant resides or does business, or at the option of the
defendant, such action shall be transferred, upon motion made within 30 days
after commencement of the action, to Salt Lake County.
History: C. 1953. 76-10-924, enacted by L.
1979, eh. 79, $ 14.
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78-10-925. Statute of limitations.
(1) Any action brought-by the attorney general pursuant to this act is
barred if it is not commenced within four years atter the cause of action
accrues.
(2) Any other action pursuant to this act is barred if it is not commenced
within iour years after the cause of action accrues, or within one year after the
conclusion of an action brought by the state pursuant to this act based in
whole or in part on any matter complained ^tln the subsequent action, whichever is the latter.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-925, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79, 4 15,

76-10-926. Interpretation of act.
The legislature intends that the courts, in construing this act, will be
guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal
antitrust statutes and by other state courts to comparable state antitrust
statutes.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-926. enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79. * 16.
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Repealing Clause.
Section 17 of Laws 1979. uh. 79 provided:
"All i)t" Chapter I ot Title 50 is repealed."

PART 16
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
bection
76-10-1601
76-10-1602
76-10-lb0o
76-10-1603 5

76-10-1604

Section
76-10-1605

Short title.
Definitions
Unlawtul acts
Violation a felony — Costs —
Forreiture — Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution or reorganization —- Restraining orders and injunctions — Hearings — Special
verdict — Findings — Judgm e n t and ovder ot iorie\tur^ —
Seizure ol Drooerty — Sale —
Proceeds— Petitions tor remission or mitigation of forfeiture
— Hearing — Disposition
Enforcement authority ot peace
officers

76-10-1601.

76-10-1606
76-10-1607
76-10-1608
76-10-l6u9

Remedies of person injured bv a
pattern or uniawtul activity —
Double damages — Coses, including attorney s fee — Arbitration — Agency — Burden or
proof — Actions by attorney
general or county attorney —
Dismissal — Statute ot limitations — Authonzea orders ot
district court
Repealed.
Evidentiary value of criminal
judgment m civil proceeding
Severamhty clause
Prospective aopiication.

Short title.

This act is the "Pattern of Unlawtul Activuy Act."
H i s t o r v : C. 19.13. 76-10-1601. e n a c t e d bv
L. 1081, en. 94, * I; L. 1985, ch. ^34. <j 1;
1987, ch. 238, ^ i.
C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — The 19S5 amendment
suostituted is known ' for '^hall be known and
mav be cited "
The i9b7 amendment substituted "the 'Pattern ot Uniawtul Activity Act ' tor "known as
the Utah Racketeering fnfluences and Ciiminai Enterprise Act
The pnrase this act', as used in this section,
means Laws L987 :n, 238, O 1 to 7, vvhicn
appear as >»* 76-10-lbOl to 76-10-1603 5,
76-10-1605, 76-10-1608 and 76-10-1609.

P u b l i c a c c e s s to c o m p l a i n t .
Detendants who alleged that their prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Criminal
Enterprises Act, 18 U S C.A * 19bl and this
Utan counterpart to that statule was intended
merely to intimidate them and that the complaint should therefore remain sealed did not
overcome the common law right and interest in
public ^ccess to the complaint w a n a sutFicient
showing of p u v a t e or public harm. HuntsmanChnstensen Coip v Enti ma Indus , inc , 6i9
F. Supp 733 (D. Utah 1986)
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78-10-1602,

Definitions.

As used in this part:
(1) "Unlawful activity"' means to directly engage in conduct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to
engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to
engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses, regardless
of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority or is
classified as a misdemeanor or a felony:
(a) assault or aggravated assault, .45 76-5-102 and 76-5-103;
(b) terroristic threat, S 76-5-107;
(c) criminal homicide, S§ 76-5-201, 76-5-202. and 76-5-203:
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnaDping, §§ 76-5-301 and
76-5-302:
(e) arson or aggravated arson, §§ 76-6-102 and 76-6-103;
(0 causing a catastrophe, § 76-6-105;
(g) burglary or aggravated burglary, 3§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-203:
(h) burgiary of a vehicle, S 76-6-204;
(\) manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or
theft, $ 76-6-205:
(j) robbery or aggravated robbery, S§ 76-6-301 and 76-6-302:
(k) theft, .4 76-6-404;
(1) theft bv deception, § 76-6-405:
Cm) theft by extortion, 5 76-6-406:
(n) receiving stolen property, ^ 76-6-408;
(o) theft of services, § 76-6-409;
(pj forgery, 9 76-6-501;
(q) fraudulent use of a credit card, S§ 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2, and
76-6-506.4:
(r) computer fraud, Part 7, Chapter 76, Title 6:
(s) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the business of selection,
appraisal, or criticism of goods, S 76-6-508;
(t) bribery of a labor official, $ 76-6-509;
(u) defrauding creditors, § 76-6-511;
(v) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution,
§ 76-6-512;
(w; unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, ^ 76-6-513;
(x) bribery or threat to influence contest, 5 76-6-514;
(y) making a false credit report, 3 76-6-517;
(z) criminal simulation, $ 76-6-518;
(aa) criminal usury, $ 76-6-520;
(bb) false or fraudulent insurance claim, 5 76-6-521;
(cc) sale of a child, ^ 76-7-203;
(dd) bribery to influence official or political actions, 5 76-8-103;
(ee; threats to influence official or political action, § 76-8-104:
(ff) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, § 76-8-105;
(gg) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of person as public
servant. $ 76-8-106;
ihh) official misconduct, a§ 76-8-201 and 76-8-202;
(ii) obstructing justice, § 76-8-306;

(jp acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution,
§ 76-8-306.
(kk^ taise or inconsistent material statements. } 76-8-502,
(11) raise or inconsistent statements, ^ 76-8-503;
(mm) written false statements, > 76-8-504;
inn) tampering with a witness, retaliation against a witness or
informant", or bribery, > 76-8-508;
(oo) extottion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding,
* 76-8-509,
(pp> tampering with evidence, ^ 76-8-510;
(qq) intentionally or knowingly causing one animal to tight with
another. Subsection 76-9-301(l;lf):
(rr 1 aelivery to common carrier, mailing, or placement on premises
of an infernal machine, ^ 76-10-307;
iss) construction or possession of internal machine, § 76-10-308;
(tt) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assauit,
§ 76-10-507,
(uu) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, } 76-10-521;
(vv) alteration of number or mark on pistol or revolver,
§ 76-10-522:
(ww) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade name, or trade
device, * 76-10-1002,
(xx) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, trade name, or
trade devices, } 76-10-1003,
(yy) sales in containers bearing registered trademark of substituted articles, * 76-10-1004*
(zz) selling or dealing with article bearing registered trademark or
service mark with intent to defraud, ^ 76-10-1006;
(aaa) sampling, * 76-10-1102:
(bbb) gambling iraud. ^ 76-10-1103,
(ceo gamohng promotion, } 76-10-1104:
(ddd) possessing a gambling device or record, 5 76-10-1105;
(eee) confidence game, ^ 76-10-1109;
(fff) distributing pornographic material. $ 76-10-1204;
(g%g> inducing acceptance of pornographic material, s1 76-10-1205;
(hhh) dealing in harmtul material to a minor, } 76-10-1206,
(iii) distribution of pornographic films, 4 76-10-1222;
(jjj) indecent public displays, > 76-10-1228;
(kkk) prostitution, <s 76-10-1302:
(lib -aiding prostitution. <* 76-10-1304:
(mmm) exploiting prostitution, ^ 76-10-1305:
(nnn) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, ^ 76-10-1306;
(ooo) sexual exploitation of a minor, 1 76-5a-3:
(ppp> communications fraud, > 76-10-1801;
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 37,
Title 58, the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b, Title
58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(rrr* any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 1,
Title 61, the Utah Uniform Securities Act:
(sss) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 11,
Title 57, the Land and Tirneshare Saies Practices Act;

49

(ttt) false claims for public assistance, 5 55-15a-31;
(uuu) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 56,
Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code;
(vvv) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of the laws
governing taxation in this state;
(www) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 12,
Title 32a, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act;
(xxxJ any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 10,
Title 13, the Recording Practices Act;
(yyy) deceptive business practices, S 76-6-507: and
(zzz) any act illegal under the laws of the United States and enumerated in Title 18, Section 1961 (I) (B), (C), and (D) of the United
States Code.
(2) ff Enternrise ? ' means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities.
(3) "Pattern of unlawful activity'' means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes comprising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 31,
1981. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shail have occurred within tive years of the
commission of the next preceding act alleged as part ot the pattern.
(4) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a iegal
or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and locai governmental entities.
History: C. 195.'}. 76-10-1602. e n a c t e d b y
L. 1087, ch. 2,'J8, $ 2.
C o m p i l e r s N o t e s . — Laws 1987, ch. 2:58,
S 2 repeals former 3 76-10-1602. as last
K

76-10-1603.

amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234, $ 2, relating
to definitions, and enacts the present section.
„ . , . , ,
, „ „,
. u ,
C ltcd ln
, f d £ V; *•?•Awards
& * m S . 646
p
Q
F. Supp. (>21 (D. Utan 1986).

Unlawful a c t s .

(1) It is unlawful for any person who lias received any proceeds derived.
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which
the person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds
derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
that enterprise s affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
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(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of
Subsection < 1), i2), or to).
History: C. 1953. ;
L. 1987, ch. — .*>8. ^
C o m p i l e r ' s Notes.
^ 3 repeals iormer

76-10-1603, e n a c t e d b y
3.
— Laws 1987, ch 238.
^ 76-10-1603. as last

amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234. ^ 3, relating
to uniawtui acts, felony, and forfeitures, and
enacts the present section.

ANALYSIS

Oonsniracv
Pattern of racketeering activitv
Conspiracy.
Althougn conspiracy is one of the enum°rated acts or racketeering under ^ 76-I0-ln02.
it is not a separate bjsi^ tjr recovery under
thib section but 13 merely a crime that mav
qualify as» one <jf the predicate acts needed to
bhow a pattern of racketeering activity; standimj alone, a cnaree of conspiracy uoes not state
a cause ot action under this section. Bacne
Haisev Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracv Collm*
Bank & Trust Co. (D. Utah 1983) 558 FSupp
JQ49

P a t t e r n of r a c k e t e e r i n g activitv.
A pattern of racketeering activity requires
more than the mere commission oi two or more
episodes of racketeering conduct within live
years ot eacn other To torm a " p a t t e r n / the
commission of predicate acts or episodes of
criminality must be sufficiently continuous
dnd
interrelated. That is. a 'pattern ' requires
planned, ongoing continuing crime and the
t h r e a c of
continuum criminal conduct, as ODP 0 a e d to sporadic, isolated criminal episodes or
events. Cook v Ziuns First Nat'l BanK, 645 r\
Supp. ^23 (D. Utah 1986).

76-10-1603.5. Violation a feiony — Costs — Forfeiture —
Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution
or reorganization — Restraining orders and injunctions — Hearings — Special verdict — Findings — J u d g m e n t and order of forfeiture — Seizure of property — Sale — Proceeds — Petitions
for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hearing — Disposition.
(1) A person who violates any provision of § 76-10-1603 is guilty of a second
decree felony. In addition to penalties prescribed by law, the court may order
the person found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney general
brought the action, or to the county, if the county attorney brought the action,
the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of securing
the forfeitures provided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to the state
or the county:
(a) anv interest acquired or maintained in violation of any provision of
§ 76-10-1603;
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
contracturai right of any kind affording a source of influence over any
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of § 76-10-1603; and
(c) any property constituting or derived from any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectiv, from the conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful activity or from any act or conduct constituting the
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pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation of any provision of v 76-10-1603
•2) If a violation of ^ 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity
consisting of acta or conduct m violation of 4 76-10-1204. 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to forfeiture under this section
is limited to property, the seizure ur forfeiture of which wouid not constitute a
prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the
Utan Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the exercise of those righto
\3) In lieu of a line otherwise authorized by law for a violation of
> 76-10-1603, a derendant who derives profits or other proceeds from a conduct prohibited bv $ 76-10-1603, mav oe fined not more than twice the
amount of the gross profits or other proceeds.
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to criminal forfeiture under uhis section includes:
<a) real property, including things growing on. affixed to, and found in
land: and
ib) tangible and intangible personal property including money, rights,
privileges, interests, claims, and securities of any kind:
(c) but does not include property legitimately exchanged for services
rendered in connection with a defendant's exercise of his rights under the
Sixtn Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the ngnt
to appear and be defended bv counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed
by Article L Sec. 12 of the Utan Constitution.
«5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of $ 76-10-1603, and in
addition to anv penalty prescribed by law and m addition to any forfeitures
provided for :n this section, the court mav do anv or ail of the following:
<a) oraer \he person to divest himseif of any interest in or any control,
direct or 'ndirect. of any enterprise;
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including prohibiting the person from engaging in
the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the
Utan Constitution and the Constitution of the United States permit; or
(
o order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(6) If a violation of i 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity
consisting of acts or conduct in violation or 5 76-10-120 4, 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order that wouid
amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected parcv s rights under
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I,
Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution.
(7) <a) All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property described m
Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state if the action was brougnt by the
attorney general or in the county if the action was brought by a county
attorney, upon the commission of the act or conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture under this section.
(b) Any forfeitable property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the subject of a special proceeding
and an order that the property be forfeited ro the state or the county,
unless tne transferee estaolishes in a hearing held under Subsection U4>
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the property wno at the time

52

of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under this section.
(8) (a) Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, the
court may enter restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of
satisfactory performance bonds, or take any other action to preserve for
forfeiture under this section any forfeitable property described in Subsections (1) and (2):
(i) upon filing of an indictment or an information charging a violation of 5 76-10-1603 and alleging that the property with respect to
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject
to forfeiture under this section; or
(ii) prior to the filing of the indictment or information, if, after
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property ana
after affording them an opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that:
(A) there is a substantial probability that the state will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order
will result in the prouerty being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(B) the need to preserve the availability of the property or
prevent its sale, distribution, exhibition, destruction, ur removal
through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship
on any party against whom the order is to be entered:
(iii) an oraer entered under Subsection (ii) is effective for no more
than 90 days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or
uniess an indictment or information as described in Subsection ii) has
been filed.
(b) A temporary restraining order may be entered upon application of
the attorney general or a county attorney without notice or opportunity
for a hearing, when an information or indictment has not yet been filed
with respect to the property, if the attorney general or county attorney
demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice
would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture or wouid
jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. The temporary order expires not more than ten days after it is entered uniess extended for good
cause shown or uniess the party against whom it is entered consents to an
extension. A hearing concerning an order entered under this subsection
shall be held as soon as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
(c) The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding
evidence it may receive and consider at any hearing held under this
subsection.
(9) ia) Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of
§ 76-10-1603, the jury, if the case was tried to a jury, shall be instructed
and asked to return a special verdict as to whether any of the property
identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.5(1) and (2).
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«b) If the case is tried without a mrv, the jud^e shall make specific
written findings if he determines that the property identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.5(1) and
<2). Whether property is forfeitable shall be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(10) (a; Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of
S 76-10-1603 and upon the jury's special verdict or the judge's finding
that the property is forfeitable, the court shall enter a judgment ana order
of forfeiture of the property to the state or the county ana shall authorize
the attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property ordered
forfeited upon the terms stated by the court in its order. Following the
entry of an order declaring property forfeited, the court mav, upon application ot the attorney general or the county attorney, enter approonate
restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory
performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the
state or countv m property ordered forfeited.
(b) Anv income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an interest in an enterprise or Droperty which has been ordered forfeited under
this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the
enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect
the interests of the state or county or third parties.
(11) (a) After seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the
attorney general or the countv attorney shall direct the disposition of the
property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provision for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest
not exercisable by or transferable for ^alue to the state or the county,
expires and does not revert to the defendant. The defendant or any person
acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant is not eligible to
purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the attorney general or the
county attorney.
(b) The court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the property pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the
sale or disposition of the property would result in irreparable injury,
harm, or loss to him.
(c) The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited
under this section and any moneys forfeited may be used first to pay
expenses of the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure,
maintenance, and custody of the property pending its disposition, advertising, and court costs.
(12) Regarding property ordered forfeited under this section, the attorney
general or the county attorney may:
(a) grant petitions for mitigacion or remission of forfeiture, restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other
action to protect the rights of innocent persons m the interest of justice
and as is consistent with the provisions of this section;
(b) compromise claims arising under this section;
(c) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a
forfeiture under this section;
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(d) direct the disposition by the state or the county of ail property
ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provision for the rights of innocent persons:
(e) destroy or otherwise dispose of property determined to be obscene
or pornographic; and
(f) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain
property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disnosition.
113) Except under Subsection (16), a party claiming an interest m property
subject to forfeiture under this section:
(a) may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving
the forfeiture of property under this section; and
ib) may not commence an action at law or equity against the state or
the county concerning the validity of his alleged interests in the property
subsequent to the filing of an indictment or an information alleging t h a t
the prooerty is subject to forfeiture under this section.
(14) The district court of the state which has jurisdiction of a case under
this part may enter orders under this section without regard to location of any
property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section, or which has
been ordered forfeited under this section.
(15) To facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited
and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring propertv forfeited to the state
or county, the court may. upon application of the attorney general or the
^ouncv attorney, ;rde^ rh.-M, the testimony of anv witness relating to ihe prooerty forfeited be taken oy deposition, and tnac any oootc, paper, document,
record, recording, or other material not privileged shall be produced as provided for depositions and discovery under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(16) (a) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the
attorney general or the county attorney shall publish notice of the order
and of its intent to dispose of the property as the court may direct. The
attorney general or the county attorney may also provide direct written
notice to any person known to have an alleged interest in the property
subjecc to the order of forfeiture, as a substitute for published notice as to
those persons so notified.
(b) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest m
property which has been ordered forfeited to the state or to the county
under this section may, within 30 days of the final publication ot notice or
his receipt of notice under Subsection <16)(a), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing is held before the court without a jury.
(c) The petition shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner under
penalty of perjury. It shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the
property, and any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and
the relief sought.
(d) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable, be heid
within 30 days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the
hearing on the petition and any petition tiled by any other person unaer
this section, other than the defendant.
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te; At the hearing, the petitioner mav testify and present evidence and
witnesses on his own behalf ana cross-examine witnesses who appear at
the hearing. The attorney general or countv attorney mav present evidence ana witnesses m rebuttal and in defense of the claim to the prooerty and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition
to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall consider the relevant portion or the record of the criminal case which resulted
m the order of forfeiture. The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of
Evidence at a hearing held under this subsection.
if) The court shall amend the order of forfeiture m accordance with its
determination, if after the hearing the court determines that the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the oetitioner nas a legal right, title, or interest in the property,
and the right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid
in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in
the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right,
title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of tne
acts or conduct which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under
this section; or
(ii) the petitioner is a bona tide purchaser for value of the right,
title, or interest in the property ana at the time of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under
this section.
(g) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this
subsection, or if no petitions are riled following the expiration .if the
period Droviaed in Subsection il6>i b) for the tiling of petitions, the btate or
the county has clear title to property subject to the order of forfeiture and
may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee.
History: C. 1953, > 76-10- lfiOa.5. e n a c t e d
by L. 1987, eh. 2:!S, * 4.

76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers.
Notwithstanding anv law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah
shall have authority to enforce rhe criminal provisions of this act by initiating
investigations, assisting grand juries, obtaining indictments, tiling informations, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney
general or county attorneys' offices.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 76-10-1(504, e n a c t e d by
L. 1981. ch. 34, * 1.
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76-10-1605, Remedies of person injured by a pattern of unlawful activity — Double damages — Costs, including attorney's fee — Arbitration — Agency —
Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general
or county attorney — Dismissal — Statute of limitations — Authorized orders of district court.
' I ) A oerson iniured m his oerson. business, or property oy a person engaged m conduct forbidden bv anv provision or > 76-10-1603 mav sue m an
appropriate district court ana recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of whether:
'a) "he imurv is separate or aistmct from the miurv sutfered as a result
or the acts or conduct constituting the pattern or unlawful conduct alleged
as part of the cause of action; or
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal bv any court of the state or
of the United States
(2) A partv who prevails on a cause of action brougnt under this section
recovers the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
13) xAll actions ^rismtr under this section whicn are grounded in iraud are
subject to arbitration under Chapter ,31, Title 78.
'4) In ail actions under this section, a principal is liaole for actual damages
for harm caused ov an agent acting within the scope oi either his empiovment
or apparent authority. A Dnncipai is haoie for dounle damages only if the
pattern ot unlaw rul activity alleged and pi oven as part or the cause of action
was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, undertaken, performed, or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent
acting withm the ^oope of his u molovment.
<5; In ail actions arising under this section, the burden of proof is clear and
convincing evidence.
(6) The attorney general or any county attorney may maintain actions under this section on behalf of rhe state, the county, or anv person injured by a
person engaged m conduct "brbidden by any provision of $ 76-10-lbOS, to
prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined in chis section and may recover
the damages and costs allowed by this section.
(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of
action shall be stated with particularity against each defendant.
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted by a private
party under this section is dismissed prior to trial or disposed of on summary
judgment, or if it is determined at trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party shall recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses incurred because
of the defence against the action, claim, or counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall be commenced
within three years after the conduct prohibited by ^ 76-10-1603 terminates or
the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any
limitation to the contrary
(10) «a) In any action Drought under this section, the district court has
jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined by this sec-
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tion by issuing appropriate orders aiter making provisions tor the rights
of innocent persons.
ib) Before liability is determined in any action brousnt under this section, the diotnct court may:
a) issue restraining oraers and injunctions:
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any other bond it
considers appropriate and necessary in connection with any prouerty
or any requirement imposed upon a party by rhe court: ana
(lii; enter any other order the court considers necessary and
proper.
ic) After a determination of liability, the district court mav, m addition
to granting the relief allowed in Subsection il), do any one or all of the
loilowmg:
U) order any person to divest himself of any interest m or any
control, direct or indirect, of any enterDrise:
(iD imoose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments or anv person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in. 10
the extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States permit: or
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise,
(d) However, if an action is orougnt to obtain any relief oroviaed by
this section, and if the conduct prohibited bv ^? 76-10-1603 has for its
pattern of unlawful activity acts or conduct illegal under ^ 76-10-1204.
76-10-1205, 76-10-1206. or 76-10-1222, the court mav not enter any order
that would amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, or Article L. Sec. 15 or the Utah Constitution. The court
shall, upon the request ot any atfected party, and upon the notice to ail
parties, prior to the issuance of any order provided for in this suosection,
and at any later time, hold hearings as necessary to determine whether
any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine if
there is probable cause to believe that any act or conduct alleged violates
§ 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or76-10-l222. In making its findings the court shall be guided by the same considerations required of a
court making similar tmdings in criminal caseb brought under
§ 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-L206, or 76-10-1222. including, but not
limited to, the definitions in §§ 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-1216,
and the exemptions in .} 76-10-1226.
History: C. 195.5, * 76-10-1605, enacted by
L. 1987, ch. 238, } 5,
Compiler's Note*». — Laws 1()87, ch. 238.
§ 5 repealed former ? 76-10-1605, as enacted

76-10-1606.

by Laws 1981, ch. 94, ^ 1. relating to remedies
of a person injured by '\ pattern or racKereenn^
activity, and enacts the present section.

Repealed.

Repeal*. — Laws 1987, ^h 2^8, ^ 8 repeals
$ 76-10-1606, as last amended bv Law^ 19S5.
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ch. 23 I, 5 4, relating to oavmenrs ro the _;eneral fund of the state or a countv

76-6-30S. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in the business of
selection, appraisal* or criticism of goods or services.—(I""
A person is
guuty ot a clai>3 B misdemeanor when, without the consent of the employer
or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer or principal.
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the employee, agent,
or fiduciary of an employer or principal any benent with the puroose of
influencing the conduct of the eniT)loye*7 agent, or fiduciary in relating to
his employer's or principal's affairs; or
(b) He, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or principal, solicits, accepts, or agrees 1o accept any benefit from anorher upon an
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence nis conduct m
relation to his employers or principal's affairs; provided that this section
does not apply to inducements made or accepted solely for the purpose ot
causing a chancre m employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary.
(2) A person is gudty of "Violation of this section if he holds himself
out to the puolic as being engaged m the business of making disinterested
selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods or services and he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to iniluence his selection, appraisal,
or criticism.
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